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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The vast public interest in social networks has opened up many new spaces of
possible research in computing. This research adopts web-based social networks as the
foundation for studying trust. The goal of this work is twofold: First, find ways to utilize
the structure of social networks and the trust relationships within them to accurately infer
how much two people that are not directly connected might trust one another, and second,
show how those  trust inferences can be integrated into applications. The ultimate goal is
to create software that is intelligent with respect to the user's social preferences such that
the user's experience is personalized, and the information presented to them is more
useful.
Tens of millions of users participate in web-based social networking. The web-
based nature of these networks means that the data is publicly available; the websites that
are taking advantage of Semantic Web technologies, such as FOAF, have even taken this
a step further, making the social network information easily available to any system that
2wants to incorporate it. Similarly, the role of social trust in computing is becoming a
prominent topic for research on the Semantic Web, within human-computer interaction,
and in the larger computing community as a whole.
In this work, I look at instances where trust is integrated into a social network.
The first step to facilitate that integration is to have a definition of trust that captures the
social features while being narrow enough to function in the environment of a social
network. Given two people, Alice and Bob, I define trust as follows: Alice trusts Bob if
she commits to an action based on a belief that Bob's future actions will lead to a good
outcome. From that definition, functional properties of trust can be extracted, including
transitivity, composability, asymmetry, and personalization.
This definition has allowed for the development of two naturally-evolved trust
networks that are used in this research. The first has nearly 2,000 members and is entirely
based on the semantic web. Using an ontology I created to extend the Friend of a Friend
(FOAF) vocabulary, the network is created by spidering files on the semantic web and
building a centralized model. The second network is also available on the semantic web,
but has a more typical web-based social network structure, with user accounts and a
central website. This trust network backs the FilmTrust website, and has over 300
members.
Using these foundations of trust in web-based social networks, and real networks
as testbeds, I move toward inferring trust within the network. If two individuals are not
directly connected, a trust inference uses the paths that connect them in the social
network, and the trust values along those paths, to come up with a recommendation about
how much one person might trust the other. I present algorithms for inferring trust in
3networks where trust is assigned on a binary scale, and when it uses a continuous range
of values. In both cases, I show that trust can be inferred quite accurately.
The natural question that follows regards how the inferred trust values can be
used. I demonstrate this, and their benefit, through two applications. The first is
FilmTrust, a web-based social network that is integrated into a movie rating and reviews
website. The trust values are used to personalize the user experience. Reviews are
ordered according to the trustworthiness of the author, as calculated from the users
perspective. Trust values are also used to create personalized recommended movie ratings
for the user. When the user looks at a specific movie, they are shown the overall average
rating, as well as the recommended rating calculated using trust values as weights. I show
that when the user's opinion is divergent from the average opinion, that the trust-based
recommendations significantly outperform both the average rating and the ratings
generated by traditional collaborative filtering algorithms. The second application to use
trust values is TrustMail, and email client that displays the trust rating of the sender next
to each message. Users can sort their inboxes according to the trustworthiness of the
sender, with the goal of identifying useful and important messages that might otherwise
be missed.
The contributions of this work are relevant within the space of trust and social
networks, but also as a general technique within complex systems. The analysis of the
type of network and functional properties of the relationship (trust in this case) is what
lead to algorithms for inferring indirect relationships in the system. That same type of
analysis can be used to develop algorithms for other complex systems. I envision carrying
this work into other spaces to show this connection. One project where I have already
4begun this work is with food webs, an ecological network illustrating which species eat
which species in an ecosystem. The same sort of analysis used for trust can be applied
there, utilizing phylogenic, taxonomic, and known trophic relationships to infer possible
trophic links that have not been observed. The promise of such techniques is to help the
users of a system – be it web users reviewing movies, or scientists interacting with their
own specific system – to better understand a layer of the complexity and thus help them
make more informed and better decisions.
1.1  Contributions
The main focus of this dissertation is to illustrate how an analysis of the trust
relationships in web-based social networks can lead to methods for inferring
relationships, and that those inferred values, when integrated into applications, can
enhance the user experience.
My contributions can benefit research in online communities, the semantic web,
recommender systems, and complex systems analysis. Through this work I have shown
that using inferred trust relationships in web-based social networks offers some real
benefits to the user. In order to accomplish this:
• I present a formalization of trust as a computational concept within web-based
social networks, by presenting a definition and describing the functional
properties of trust that follow from the definition.
• I present a set of algorithms for inferring trust relationships in social networks that
are shown to be quite accurate.
• I show that using trust inferences to make predictive recommendations can offer
significant improvements when the user's opinion is divergent from the average.
51.2  Organization
For this dissertation, I have chosen trust in web-based social networks as a very
specific area to study the larger issue of trust, reputation, and relationships in social
networks. The decision to work with web-based social networks is enforced by the fact
that they form a large, publicly available dataset with tremendous interest from the
general public. Chapter 2 specifically defines what qualifies as a web-based social
network, and then presents the results of an exhaustive survey of websites. Over
133,000,000 user accounts spread across 127 websites were found, with subjects ranging
from the deeply religious to the fringes of alternative sexual lifestyles. The description of
the size and scope of websites is followed by a explanation of how users are able to add
information to their social relationships. In fact, several large social networks already
contain a notion of expressed trust between users, strengthening the choice to work with
these datasets. Chapter 2 also introduces the Friend-Of-A-Friend(FOAF) Project, a
Semantic-Web based technology that allows users to combine information about
themselves from a variety of websites, and make statements about their friends even if
those statements are not supported by the sites of which the user is a member.
Before making any computations with trust in social networks, it is vitally
important to know what trust is and the properties it has. Within computer science, trust
has been co-opted by many subfields to mean many different things. It is a  descriptor of
security and encryption (Kent, Atkinson, 1998); a name for authentication methods or
digital signatures (Ansper, et al., 2001);  a measure of the quality of a peer in P2P
systems (Lee, et al., 2003); a factor in game theory (McCabe et al., 2003); a model for
agent interactions (Jonker, Treur, 1999); a gauge of attack-resistance (Wallach, et al.,
61997);a component of ubiquitous computing (Shankar, Abraugh, 2002); a foundation for
interactions in agent systems (Maes, Kozierok, 1994; Barber, Kim, 2000); and a
motivation for online interaction and recommender systems (Abdul-Rahman, Hailes,
1997). It is only in the last few years that the computing community has begun to look at
the more social aspect of trust as a relationship between humans.
The difficulty of combining trust with algorithms and mathematical analyses is
that trust is difficult to define, let alone to pin down in a quantifiable way. Intense
theoretical analysis and complex models are one way to address this issue. However, the
real boost to the union of these two topics has come in the form of web-based social
networks that force people to quantify trust.
Beginning with work in the philosophical, sociological, and psychological
communities, I present a definition that captures the nature of social trust relationships
and also remains clear and simple enough to be used in social networks on the web. As is
justified in chapter 3, the following definition of trust is used throughout this work:  Alice
trusts Bob if she commits to an action based on a belief that Bob's future actions will lead
to a good outcome. This definition pervades this work. The first application is as a
justification for the properties of trust that  forms the foundation of the algorithms:
transitivity, composability, and asymmetry.
These definitions allow for the creation of algorithms that utilize the trust
networks. Chapters 5 and 6 present algorithms for working with networks where trust is
expressed in binary values and over a continuous range, respectively. When a person has
not expressed a trust rating for another person, the paths that connect them in a network
can be used to infer how much one (the source) should trust the other (the sink). These
7chapters introduce the algorithms and present a theoretical and experimental analysis of
their accuracy.
In chapter 5, I introduce two variations on an algorithm for inferring trust
relationships in networks with binary trust ratings ("trusted" or "not trusted"). Using a
statistical analysis and generated social networks for simulations, it is shown that these
algorithms can produce highly accurate inferences about how much one person should
trust another when as few as half of the trust ratings in the network agree with the source
node's opinions. The relies on the binomial distribution created with the binary system.
Chapter 6 moves to ratings over a continuous scale. Because the properties of the binary
networks are not available to help increase accuracy, chapter 6 begins with an analysis of
how trust rating and path length affect the agreement between a source and other nodes.
This analysis is then used to develop an algorithm for calculating trust in networks with
continuous ratings. Two naturally developed trust networks are used to show that my
method is significantly better than several other algorithms taken from the literature.
To demonstrate the usefulness of these calculated ratings, two applications are
introduced that personalize the users' experiences based on their trust ratings and social
connections. The first is FilmTrust, a website that integrates social networks, trust, and
movie ratings and reviews. Users build social connections to other people in the network.
For each connection, they rate how much they trust their friend's opinion about movies.
Users also rate movies and write reviews. The two are combined when a user visits a
page about a movie. They are shown the average rating for the film and a personalized
"recommended rating" calculated from the most trusted people who have rated the movie.
As users' opinions deviate from the average, the personalized rating remains a relatively
8accurate estimation of their opinions. Reviews of the movies are also sorted according to
the trustworthiness of the author so users see the most relevant ones first.
The second application is TrustMail, an email client that uses the calculated trust
rating of each email's sender as a score for the message. Users are able to sort messages
according to their trust value. Because ratings are drawn from an extended social
network, they help users identify potentially important messages from otherwise
unknown senders. The ratings can also be used for sorting spam folders so that
improperly classified messages could be pulled out more easily.
Ultimately, trust and social preferences can be integrated into any number of
potential applications. However, there is a larger application of this work. Social
networks are only one type of complex system, and trust is only one type of relationship.
The analysis in this work shows how an understanding of the properties of relationship-
types within systems can lead to effective algorithms for understanding the relationships
implicit in those systems. There are many other projects where these types of analyses
can lead to results. Chapter 10 approaches this broader application with brief
introductions to ongoing projects extending the work in this dissertation, as well as
ecoinformatics, and information filtering.
This work is both the beginnings for future work and a case study. The
applications presented here represent only a small portion of how the specific results of
trust in social networks can be applied, and a still smaller fraction of how such techniques
can be applied to complex systems analysis. This work should complement the growing
body of work that is integrating social network analysis and trust into the user experience.
Furthermore, the results here seem to suggest that a deeper understanding of the
9relationships in complex systems and methods for inferring information about them has
the potential to lead to new discoveries in the social, biological, and physical sciences.
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Chapter 2
Web-Based Social Networks
2.1  Introduction
Web-based social networks (WBSN) have grown quickly in number and scope
since the mid-1990s. They present an interesting challenge to traditional ways of thinking
about social networks. First, they are large, living examples of social networks. It has
rarely, if ever, been possible to look at an actual network of millions of people without
using models to fill in or simulate most of the network. The problem of gathering social
information about a large group of people has been a difficult one. With WBSNs, there
are many networks with millions of users that need no generated data. These networks
are also much more complex with respect to the types of relationships they allow.
Information qualifying and quantifying aspects of the social connection between people
is common in these systems. This means there is a potential for much richer analysis of
the network.
As interest in social networking has grown, the term "social network" has become
looser. Many sites promote themselves as social networks when they do not maintain any
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data that would be useful for a network analysis. This chapter presents a set of criteria for
qualifying a system as a WBSN and another set for determining when information can be
considered part of a relationship. Those principles guided an exhaustive survey of
existing WBSNs followed by a discussion of trends in social network data sharing on the
Semantic Web.
2.2  Previous Work
This survey is motivated by the large body of work in social network analysis and
in the study of online communities. While it would be impossible to cite all of the
influential work related to social network analysis, the range of interest in the topic across
nearly every academic field is impressive. These are just a few examples to give a sense
of that scope.
Much of the foundational work in the analysis of social networks, and the major
advances in the 20th century have been carried out in the fields of sociology, psychology,
and communication (Barnes, 1972),(Wellman, 1982),(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). With a
goal of understanding the function of relationships in social networks, and how they
affect the social systems in which the networks exist, the research has been both
theoretical and applied. Labor markets (Montgomery, 1991), public health (Cattell,
2001), and psychology (Pagel, et al., 1987) are just a few of the spaces where social
network analysis has yielded interesting results.
 In the last five to ten years, a new interest has developed in the structure
and dynamics of social networks to complement the work already being done in social
network theory. Though one of the first, and most popular papers in this area – Milgram's
"Six Degrees of Separation" study (1967) – was conducted by a social scientist, the topic
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is of increasing interest to physical scientists. Their studies have addressed issues such as
mathematical analyses of the structure of small world networks (Watts, 1999),
community structure (Girvan, Newman, 2002), and how social network structure affects
the spread of disease (Dezo, et al., 2002), (Jones, et al. 2003), (Newman, 2002).
As the web emerged, online communities and social networks supported by the
internet became a source of interesting data. Garton, et al. (1997) presented an excellent
introduction to how traditional methods of social network analysis could be applied to
these online communities. Work in this space was also embraced by the interdisciplinary
field of human-computer interaction, which produced interesting work on designing and
supporting online communities (Preece, 2000), their application to problems such as
collaborative filtering (Kautz, et al., 1997) and electronic commerce (Jung, Lee, 2000).
The promise of social networks on the web is that they offer new opportunities to
researchers across the board. With network topologies that can be automatically extracted
from the web, the social networks provide a new, large source of data for the more
mathematical and structural types of analysis. At the same time, users are participating in
rich social environments online while building these networks. That holds promise for
scientists interested in the general function of social interactions, and because the
contexts of these social networks is often very restricted (e.g. business networking among
Asian-Americans), they can serve as a window into specific communities
2.3   Definitions
There are many ways in which social networks can be automatically derived on the
web: users connected through transactions in online auctions, users who post within the
same thread on a news group or message board, or even members of groups listed in an
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HTML document can be turned into a social network. Many online communities claim to
be or support social networks, but lack some of the properties one may expect of a social
network. This work uses a very specific definition. A web-based social network must
meet the following criteria:
1. It is accessible over the web with a web browser. This excludes networks where users
would need to download special software in order to participate and social networks
based on other technologies, such as mobile devices.
2. Users must explicitly state their relationship with other people qua stating a
relationship. Although social networks can be built from many different interactions,
a WBSN is more than just a potential source of social network data; it is a website or
framework that has the development of an explicit social network as a goal. This
criteria rules out building social networks from auction transactions, co-postings, or
similar events that link people when a connection is created as a side effect of another
process.
3. The system must have explicit built-in support for users making these connections.
The system should be specifically designed to support social network connections.
This means that a group of friends who each maintain a simple HTML page with a
list of his or her friends would not qualify as a WBSN because HTML itself does not
have explicit built-in support for making social connections. There must be some
greater over-arching and unifying structure that connects the data and regulates how it
is presented and formatted.
4. Relationships must be visible and browsable. The data does not necessarily have to be
public (i.e. visible by anyone on the web) but should be accessible to at least the
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registered users of a system. Websites where users maintain completely closed lists of
contacts are not interesting for their social networking properties – neither to users or
people performing a network analysis – and are thus ignored for these purposes. For
example, some websites allow users to bookmark the profiles of other users and
others allow users to maintain address books. Even when these lists are explicit
expressions of social connections, they would not qualify a system as a WBSN if they
cannot be seen and browsed by other users. One important note here is that the system
itself does not need built-in browsing support. Rather, each user's data must be made
accessible with unambiguous pointers to each social connection.
These criteria qualify most of the major social networking websites like Tickle,
Friendster, Orkut, and LinkedIn while ruling out many dating sites, like Match.com, and
other online communities that connect users, such as Craig's List or MeetUp.com. Sites
that require users to pay for membership are included as long as they meet the criteria
above.
Within these social networks, users are often able to say more about their
relationships than simply stating they exist. However, it is easy to confuse functionality
of a WBSN with actual information about a relationship. Again, it is helpful to have a set
of criteria that establish when an action or datum qualifies as information about a
relationship in the social network.
1. A basic social networking connection between individuals must exist before
additional information can be added. Sites that allow users to rate others, such as
rating someone's appearance, often do not require that users have a connection –
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anyone can rate anyone else. In order to be used as additional information about a
relationship, there must be a relationship between people in the first place. Thus,
simple rating systems that do not require users to be socially connected are not
counted.
2. The information must be persistent. Many websites allow users to send messages or
mini-messages (such as "winks" or "smiles"1 on dating-related sites). Since these are
sent and do not persist as a label on the relationship, they are not a piece of
information about a relationship. On the other hand, comments or testimonials about a
person do persist on the website and are considered as free text descriptions of a
relationship.
3. The information must be visible and modifiable by the user who added it. At the same
time, the information does not have to be publicly visible. Some data, like trust
ratings, are personal and users would not want this shared with others.
2.4  A Survey of Web-based Social Networks
The goal of this survey was to profile every social network on the web that met
the criteria above. The number of users and primary purpose of each website, along with
what additional relationship information they support, if any, was gathered from each
website.
                                                 
1 "Winks" or "smiles" are usually sent by clicking an icon on a member's page. That member then receives
a small message letting them know that someone sent them a "wink" or a "smile". These mimic their real-
world counterparts in that they are small indications of interest without requiring the sender to say much.
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This list grows daily and certain sites are not included because they are accessible
by invitation only or in languages that could not be translated. An up to date list is
maintained at http://trust.mindswap.org.
As of January 15, 2005 the survey encompassed 125 social networks with over
115 million members.
2.4.1  Size
The size of the networks varied greatly. Eighteen sites have over one million
members, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Million-member WBSNs
Website URL Number of
Members
1 Tickle http://tickle.com 18,000,000
2 Friendster http://friendster.com 17,000,000
3 Adult Friend Finder http://adultfriendfinder.com 15,700,000
4 Black Planet http://blackplanet.com 14,000,000
5 Hi5 http://hi5.com 6,100,000
6 Asia Friend Finder http://asiafriendfinder.com 6,000,000
7 My Space http://myspace.com 6,000,000
8 LiveJournal http://livejournal.com 5,700,000
9 Friend Finder http://friendfinder.com 3,600,000
10 Amigos http://amigos.com 3,500,000
11 Orkut http://orkut.com 3,000,000
12 gradFinder http://www.gradfinder.com/ 3,000,000
13 Alt.com http://alt.com 2,600,000
14 LinkedIn http://linkedin.com 1,500,000
15 Zero Degrees http://www.zerodegrees.com/ 1,300,000
16 Out Personals http://outpersonals.com 1,050,000
17 The Face Book http://thefacebook.com 1,000,000
18 Fotolog http://fotolog.net 1,000,000
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Figure 2.1 shows the membership of sites ranked according to size. There is an
exponential decrease in the membership of the sites moving from the largest to the
smallest. At the bottom of the membership list were sites with only a few hundred
members.
Figure 2.1: WBSN membership for sites ranked by population. Note that the y-axis is a
logarithmic scale.
2.4.2  Categorization
With only a few exceptions, WBSNs fell into a small group of categories, shown
in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2. Categories of WBSNs
Purpose Number of Sites Number of Members
Blogging 5 5,700,000
Business 16 3,300,000
Dating 23 49,000,000
Pets 6 80,000
Photos 7 1,015,000
Religious 11 650,000
Social/Entertainment 55 70,000,000
Some sites fall into multiple categories (e.g. there are several sites that are both
"Religious" and "Dating" sites), so member and site totals in Table 2.2 add up to more
than the overall numbers.
Perhaps it is not surprising that sex and love play prominent roles among these
websites. The "Dating" group is second in number of sites and membership only to the
more general "Social/Entertainment" category. Seven of the eighteen million-member
sites list dating or personals as one of their explicit purposes. Two of the most explicit
dating sites fall into the million-member club: Adult Friend Finder (a.k.a. Passion.com),
"The World's Largest Sex & Swinger Personals site" with over 15.5 million members,
and Alt.com, "the World's Largest Bondage, BDSM & Alternative Lifestyle Personals."
At the same time, there is a continuum within these categories. At the opposite end of the
spectrum is HotSaints.com, a site for single Mormons whose motto is "Chase and be
chaste." Religion and romance were actually tightly coupled among sites surveyed; half
of the "religious" sites stated dating or personals as one of their primary goals.
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2.4.3  Relationship Data
One of the primary questions motivating this survey was to see how WBSNs
allowed users to add information about their relationships. Of the 125 sites found, fifty-
four had some method for describing relationships.
On twenty-nine sites, the only method of describing relationships was through
free-text comments or testimonials. With the exception of LinkedIn (a business site), all
of those were dating or social/entertainment sites where testimonials generally took the
form of friends writing about their friends. A random sampling from some of these pages
included the following comments. Names have been changed to protect users' privacy.
User X is my absolute favorite Pittsburgher. I refuse to go
home to Pittsburgh unless User X is there to ease the pain
of the awful big-haired reality that Pittsburgh is. I love
User X a ton and am always interested to see what this girl
is up to.
User Y, you can't have User Z. I love him too much. I too
have hugged him and I never want to let go. He is my teddy
bear and I want to have his babies. A little piece of me
dies every time that I call and you don't answer. You know
it was meant to be, you can't avoid the truth... Come back
to me schnookums!!!!
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Well everyone..this is my OLDER sister User M...wat can i
say about her? hmmmz..well first of all...shes scary even
tho shes like a million times shorter than me! =P..and shes
really really really EMBARASSING! and she says im boy
crazy..YOU ARE ER! *wink wink* newaiz gonna go now..b4 u
can read this @ home.. Bubiez...love ya er..see ya @
home....dont hurt me =)
These examples are fairly representative of the set of free-text testimonials out
there. They are amusing and offer entertainment, but from a computational perspective
they are not useful.
The other twenty-five sites that allowed users to describe relationships in a more
restricted way. Twenty of them include options for users to categorize their relationships.
Relationship types can be user-created labels in a few cases, but generally users choose
from an enumerated list. Table 2.3 shows a few examples of these options.
These relationship types are much more useful when attempting to gain a deeper
understanding of the dynamics within social network. Even when only a few options are
offered, such as those from Naseeb seen in Table 2.3, the ability to approximately rank
the strength of connections between people is greatly increased.
Other sites offer users the ability to rate aspects of their relationships on a numeric
scale. Table 2.4 has a sampling of the features and rating scales available from some
sites. From the perspective of someone performing a social network analysis, these
numbers open up many new possibilities.
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Table 2.3: A sampling of websites with options they offer for describing relationships.
Website URL Relationship Type Options
Naboe http://naboe.com Friend, Lover, Neighbor, Brother,
Sister, Cousin, Daughter, Son,
Granddaughter, Grandson,
Grandparent, In-law, Aunt, Uncle,
Relative, Father, Mother, Spouse,
Niece, Nephew, Employee, Business
Associate, Co-worker, Boss, Vendor,
Customer
Multiply http://multiply.com Family, Wife/Husband, Mother/ Father,
Mother-in-law/Father-in-law,
Daughter/ Son, Daughter-in-law/Son-
in-law, Sister/Brother, Sister-in-law/
Brother-in-law, Grandmother/
Grandfather, Granddaughter/Grandson,
Cousin, Second-cousin, Aunt/Uncle,
Niece/Nephew, Step-mother/step-
father, Step-sister/Step-brother, Step-
daughter/Step-son, Ex-wife/Ex-
husband, Friend of family, Distant
relative, Other relative, Life partner
People
Aggregator
http://peopleaggregator.com/ Know of, Don't know of but want to,
Know in passing, Know by reputation,
Acquaintance of, Friend of, Close
friend of, Relative
Naseeb http://naseeb.com Online Friend, Acquaintance, Friend,
Good Friend, Best Friend
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Table 2.4: A sampling of websites that allow relationship features to be rated on a
numeric scale.
Website URL Relationship
Characteristic
Rating
Scale
Orkut http://orkut.com Trust 0-3
    Sexy 0-3
    Cool 0-3
Overstock http://auctions.overstock.com Business Rating -2 - +2
    Personal Rating 0-5
RepCheck http://repcheck.com Social Trust 0-5
    Business Trust 0-5
Trust Project http://trust.mindswap.org Trust 1-10
Analysis begins with the graph structure of the social network and using the rating
numbers as labels on the edges. It is then essential to understand the functional properties
of the relationship characteristic. Knowing whether the characteristic is symmetric
between individuals, if it is transitive or composable, and other such qualities lead to the
types of algorithms and mathematical methods that could be used to gain a deeper
understanding of the indirect relationships between people in the social networks.
2.5  The Semantic Web and Friend Of A Friend (FOAF)
The 115,000,000 members of the social networks discovered in this survey do not
represent 115,000,000 unique people; about one hundred accounts in that total belong to
the author. In fact, many people maintain accounts at multiple social networking
websites. It is desirable, for example, to keep information intended for business
networking separate from information about dating. People's bosses or colleagues
certainly do not need to know they you enjoy long walks on the beach. At the same time,
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users put significant effort into maintaining information on social networks. Multiple
social network accounts are not just for compartmentalizing parts of their lives. A person
may have one group of friends who prefer Orkut, another group on Friendster, like the
quiz features of Tickle, and have an account on one or two religious websites to stay
connected to that community.
At the same time, from the perspective of managing an entire set of social
connections that are spread across sites, it is advantageous to merge all of those
connections together into one set of data. In a merged social network, friends who have
multiple accounts would be represented as a single person. Information about the user
that is distributed across several sites also would be merged. The Friend-of-a-Friend
(FOAF) Project (Dumbill, 2002) is a potential solution to sharing social networking data
among sites, and this section introduces how that is being done.
2.5.1  Background
Rather than a website or a software package, FOAF is a framework for
representing information about people and their social connections. The FOAF
Vocabulary (Brickley, Miller, 2004) contains terms for describing personal information,
membership in groups, and social connections. Table 2.5 lists the concepts and properties
of the FOAF vocabulary. The property "knows" is used to create social links between
people (i.e. one person knows another person).
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Table 2.5: FOAF Vocabulary summary. More detail about each term and its use can be
found at http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1. The term "Person" and "knows" have been
highlighted because they represent the basics needed to represent a social network.
FOAF Basics Personal Info Online Accounts / IM
     
Agent weblog OnlineAccount
Person knows OnlineChatAccount
name interest OnlineEcommerceAccount
nick currentProject OnlineGamingAccount
title pastProject holdsAccount
homepage plan accountServiceHomepage
mbox based_near accountName
mbox_sha1sum workplaceHomepage icqChatID
img workInfoHomepage msnChatID
depiction (depicts) schoolHomepage aimChatID
surname topic_interest jabberID
family_name publications yahooChatID
givenname geekcode
firstName myersBriggs
  dnaChecksum
Projects and Groups Documents and Images
   
Project Document
Organization Image
Group PersonalProfileDocument
member topic (page)
membershipClass primaryTopic
fundedBy tipjar
theme sha1
made (maker)
thumbnail
logo
The FOAF Vocabulary is represented as a Semantic Web ontology. The Semantic
Web is an extension to the current web and is designed to encode information in a way
that is machine readable. Like the current web of hypertext documents, Semantic Web
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information is maintained in documents stored on servers. Instead of using HTML, the
Semantic Web uses a hierarchy of languages, including the Resource Description
Framework (RDF) and Web Ontology Language (OWL). These languages are used to
create ontologies, comprising classes (general categories of things) and their properties.
The concepts from those ontologies are then used to describe data. There are several
forms that data modeled with RDF and OWL can take. The examples presented here are
shown in the N3 language. This shows the subject listed with each of its properties and
their values.
In Table 2.5, terms with initial capital letters are classes, and terms in all lower-
case are properties. A FOAF file will generally contain a Semantic Web-based
description of at least one person with some personal information and who that person
knows. The following code example  contains a simple FOAF description of a person
:Joe a foaf:Person;
 foaf:depiction <http://example.com/me.jpg>;
 foaf:firstname "Joe";
 foaf:lastname  "Blog";
 foaf:knows :Dan,
:K,
:Pi.
From this snippet, a program that understands OWL and RDF will be able to
process the information. Using the FOAF vocabulary , it can recognize that there is a
person named "Joe Blog" with a picture online who knows Dan, Pi, and K.
The Semantic Web acts much like a large distributed database. There may be
information about a person stored in many places. Using the basic features of RDF and
OWL, it is easy to indicate that information about a person is contained in several
documents on the web and provide links to those documents. Any tool that understands
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these languages will be able to take information from these distributed sources and create
a single model of that person, merging the properties from the disparate sites.
2.5.2  FOAF and Current WBSNs
If a website builds FOAF profiles of its users, it allows the users to own their data
in a new way. Instead of having their information locked in a proprietary database, they
are able to share it and link it. Some WBSNs are already moving in this direction. Six of
the sites in this survey generate FOAF files for each user, and they are shown in Table
2.6.
Table 2.6: WBSNs that provide FOAF profiles of users' social networks.
Website URL Number of Members
LiveJournal http://livejournal.com 5,700,000
eCademy http://ecademy.com 72,000
Trust Project http//trust.mindswap.org 1,700
Tribe http://tribe.net 250,000
Buzznet http://www.buzznet.com 52,000
Zopto http://zopto.com 10,500
Total   6,086,200
With this information, a user with accounts on all of these sites can create a small
document that points to the generated files. A FOAF tool would follow those links and
compile all of the information into a single profile. The code example below shows a file
that would link a person to the files maintained at each of the sites listed in Table 2.6.
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:Joe  a foaf:Person;
rdfs:seeAlso
<http://trust.mindswap.org/trustFiles/385.owl>,
<http://www.livejournal.com/users/joeblog/data/foaf>,
<http://www.tribe.net/FOAF/6bed4755-a467-4fa9-844d-
e9bfc786e570>,
<http://ecademy.com/module.php?mod=network&op=foafrdf&uid=7
1343>,
<http://joe.buzznet.com/user/foaf.xml>
<http://www.zopto.com/foaf.asp?id=10088>;
= <http://trust.mindswap.org/trustFiles/385.owl#me>.
These simple nine lines of code makes it possible to join potentially hundreds of
pieces of information distributed across six sites together into one single description of
the person.
Aside from the benefit to users who are able to merge their data, websites are also
able to benefit from FOAF data on the web. For example, a website could suggest
connections to other users in their system if FOAF data from another site shows a
connection between the two people. Some user information could be pre-filled in if it is
contained in a FOAF file somewhere else. By enhancing the user experience, a site
becomes easier and more attractive to use.
2.5.3  Extensions to FOAF
While FOAF does have a long list of properties about people, many WBSNs have
ways of describing people and relationships that are not part of the FOAF Vocabulary.
One of the benefits of the Semantic Web is that ontologies and data can be extended by
anyone, and thus it is easy to create properties that work with FOAF.
The Trust Project has created a Trust Module for FOAF that allows people to rate
how much they trust one another on a scale from 1 – 10. Trust can be assigned in general
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or with respect to a particular topic. There is also FOAF Relationship Module
(Davis,Vitiello, 2002) with over thirty terms for describing the relationships between
people, including "lost contact with", "enemy of", "employed by", "spouse of", and others
along those lines. A WBSN could co-opt these terms, or define its own set of relationship
terms or personal characteristics to include in the FOAF data about its users.
2.6  Conclusion and Future Directions
This survey of WBSNs was designed to provide a snapshot of the current state of
web-based social networks, their number, size, and complexity. With this information,
there are two clear fronts on which to progress: the computational and the analytical. The
FOAF Project presented here is useful on both fronts in that it allows separate networks
to be merged into one larger network model.
From the perspective of analysis, web-based social networks offer a look at a real
living, evolving network. Users add, remove, and change connections frequently within
these networks. The growth rate is exceptional, with larger sites gaining literally
thousands of members each day. Tracking new members and their connections to the
existing network at a regular interval would provide a window into how social networks
grow and evolve. The information about relationships stored in many of these networks
can provide an even deeper source of information, since the type of friends added to a
person's network can be tracked as well as if and when those relationship types change.
Computationally, there are also tremendous opportunities. Particularly with
information about relationships, there is space to develop new and useful algorithms for
analyzing connections within the graph structure of the social network, making
recommendations about indirect connections, and understanding the structure of
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relationships. Because many of the networks are open data sources, there is also the
possibility of integrating users' social preferences into applications. This rich web-based
data source will form the foundation of this work in personalization and social
intelligence within software.
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Chapter 3
Trust: Definition and Properties
 Functioning societies rely heavily on trust among members (Fukuyama, 1998;
Cook, 2001; Uslaner, 2002), and it is natural to expect the same to be true in online
communities. If one is building a system online, there are several strategies for increasing
the user's trust in the system and in its users overall (Shneiderman, 2000). In web-based
social networks where users are making explicit statements about their trust relationships,
the goal is not necessarily to build trust in the site or its members, but to make
computations with the data that have already been made available. In human society, trust
depends on a host of factors which cannot be easily modeled in a computational system.
When deciding whether or not to trust a person, we are each influenced by past
experiences with the person and with his or her friends, our opinions of actions the person
has taken, our own predisposition to trust that is linked to psychological factors impacted
by a lifetime of history and events (most of which are completely unrelated to the person
we are deciding to trust or not trust), rumor, influence by others' opinions, and motives to
profit by extending our trust, just to name a few. Putting a computationally usable notion
31
of trust into social networks requires a clear, narrower definition of the term that still
preserves the properties of trust with which we are familiar in our social lives.
For trust to be used as a rating between people in social networks, the definition
must be focused and simplified. Individuals need a clear definition so they know how to
describe their trust for others, and additional features of trust must be understood if trust
relationships are to be used in computation.
3.1  A Definition of Trust
Trust plays a role across many disciplines, including sociology, psychology,
economics, political science, history, philosophy, and computer science. As such, work in
each discipline has attempted to define the concept. The problem with defining trust is
that there are many different types of trust and it means something different to each
person, and potentially in each context where it is applied (Deutsch, 1973, Shapiro 1987).
Because the goal of this work is to perform computations with trust, it is natural to
turn to the computer science literature. One of the most widely cited works is Marsh's
PhD dissertation from the University of Stirling, "Formalising Trust as a Computational
Concept" (1994). In this work, Marsh gives careful attention to many facets of trust, from
the biological to the sociological, in order to develop a model for trust among agents
interacting in a distributed way. His model is complex and highly theoretical. Aside from
the difficulties with implementation, it is particularly inappropriate for use in social
networks because his focus was on interacting agents that could maintain information
about history and observed behaviors. In social networks, users assign a trust as a single
rating describing their connection to others, without explicit context or history. Thus
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much of the information necessary for a system like Marsh's is missing. Furthermore, the
intended application of this work is different, and that information is not necessary.
Web-based social networks are tools for the average web user. The definition of
trust must be uncomplicated and straightforward enough that average web users
understand what they are expressing, so they can express it accurately. For a simple, clear
definition of trust, the sociological and psychological literature has more to offer.
Deutsch (1962) contains a frequently referenced definition of trust. He states that
trusting behavior occurs when a person (say Alice) encounters a situation where she
perceives an ambiguous path. The result of following the path can be good or bad, and
the occurrence of the good or bad result is contingent on the action of another person (say
Bob). Furthermore, the negative impact of the bad result is greater than the positive
impact of the good result. This further motivates Alice to make the correct choice. If
Alice chooses to go down the path, she has made a trusting choice. She trusts that Bob
will take the steps necessary to ensure the good outcome. The requirement that the bad
outcome must have greater negative implications than the good outcome has positive
implications has been countered in other work (Golombiewski and McConkie, 1975),
which does not always require disparity.
Sztompka (1999) presents and justifies a simple, general definition of trust similar
to that of Deutsch: "Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others." There are
two main components of this definition: belief and commitment. First, a person believes
that the trusted person will act in a certain way. The belief alone, however, is not enough
to say there is trust. Trust occurs when that belief is used as the foundation for making a
commitment to a particular action. These two components are also present in the core of
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Deutsch's definition: we commit to take the ambiguous path if we believe that the trusted
person will take the action that will produce the good outcome.
Taking the main social aspects of the definitions above, the following definition is
used in this work: Alice trusts Bob if she commits to an action based on a belief that
Bob's future actions will lead to a good outcome.
The action of the trusted person and commitment by the truster do not have to be
significant. If we are looking at trust in the context of movies, we can say Alice trusts
Bob if she decides to see a movie (commits to an action) based on Bob's recommendation
(based on her belief that Bob will not waste her time).
The justification for the belief component of the definition will vary from person
to person. People may base their belief on pervious experiences in their own lives, a
history of interacting with the person, or information gathered from an outside source.
One important note about trust is that it is not actually a single value. Take a
specific topic, like movies. Users may be able to form a general opinion about how much
they trust others about movies, but it would be more accurate and specific to break that
trust down by genre. We may trust a friend about comedies, but not about dramas.
However, that is not specific enough. Within each genre, trust could be broken down by
period: we may trust someone's opinion of classic horror of the 50s and 60s, but not about
modern horror films. There are an infinite number of ways that trust can be broken down,
and when trust is used in a web-based social network, it is necessary to limit the
complexity of the expression. Thus, the applications that use trust, including those I will
present here, will always have a notion of trust that could be broken down more
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specifically. The nature of social networks requires it, and the results to follow will
demonstrate that this approach seems to be sufficient to achieve good results.
This definition forms the foundation for explaining the properties of trust,
identifying where trust exists in social networks, and how it can be used in computation.
3.2  Properties of Trust
3.2.1   Transitivity
The primary property of trust used in this work is transitivity. Trust is not
perfectly transitive in the mathematical sense; that is, if Alice highly trusts Bob, and Bob
highly trusts Chuck, it does not always and exactly follow that Alice will highly trust
Chuck. There is, however, a notion that trust can be passed between people. When we ask
a trusted friend for an opinion about a plumber, we are taking the friend's opinion and
incorporating that to help form a preliminary opinion of the plumber. Generally, when
encountering an unknown person, it is common for people to ask trusted friends for
opinions about how much to trust this new person.
There are actually two types of trust one must express: trust in a person, and trust
in the person's recommendations of other people. Alice may trust Bob to recommend a
plumber, but not trust him at all to recommend other people whose opinion about
plumbers is worth considering. Despite this dichotomy, in social networks it is preferable
to let a single value represent both of these ideas. A single rating system is also more
compatible with the traditional way users participate in social networks. Users are rarely,
if ever, asked to express opinions of others with such subtle differences. As the following
examples will show, the definition of trust supports a single value for both concepts.
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The definition of trust supports the idea of transitivity. Recall that trust involves a
belief that the trusted person will take an action that will produce a good outcome. To add
context to the discussion, consider the aforementioned case of finding a plumber. If Alice
asks Bob whether or not Chuck is a good plumber, she is going to use Bob's answer to
support her action to use Chuck as a plumber or not because she believes Bob will give
her information that will lead to a good plumbing outcome. Thus, if Bob says Alice
should trust Chuck, Alice relies on her trust in Bob to develop some trust for Chuck.
Bob's recommendation becomes a foundation for the belief component of Alice's new
trust for Chuck. She will have some trust in him because, based on Bob's information, she
believes he will take the steps necessary to produce a good outcome.
This same argument can be extended to longer chains of trust. In the situation
above, perhaps Bob does not know about Chuck. Bob may ask a trusted friend (say
Denise) about Chuck, and report back to Alice what the trusted friend has said. This adds
a step in the chain: Alice->Bob->Denise->Chuck. Alice trusts Bob to give her
information that will lead to a good outcome. Bob may decide the best way to give Alice
that good information is to talk to his trusted friends, namely Denise. By the definition of
trust, Bob trusts Denise because he expects her to give him good information about
Chuck so he can obtain a good result (in this case, giving Alice reliable information).
Since Alice trusts Bob to give her the good information, she can expect that the steps he
goes through to obtain that information are also trustworthy. Thus, trust can be passed
along a chain of trusting people. This logic also supports the use of a single value to
represent trust in a person and trust in their recommendations about other people.
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Because trust is not perfectly transitive, we could expect that it degrades along a
chain of acquaintances. Alice is likely to have more trust in Chuck if Bob knows him
directly and says he is trustworthy, than if a chain of people pass the information back to
her. The computational aspect of this work will address how to compose those trust
relationships down a chain to accurately how much the person asking for trust
information (in this case, Alice) should trust the person at the end of the chain (Chuck).
The precise method for propagating trust effectively is a computational issue, but the
point here is to show that the definition of trust supports making these computations.
Computationally, this idea of propagating trust along chains of connections (thus
exploiting some form of transitivity) has been widely studied and implemented (Gray, et
al., 2003, Guha, Kumar, 2004, Jøsang, 1996, Jøsang et al., 2003, Richardson, et al., 2003,
Ziegler, Lausen, 2004a).
3.2.2   Composability
Transitivity describes how a trust rating can be passed back through a chain of
people. This is depicted in part (a) of Figure 3.1. Recommendations about the
trustworthiness of an unknown person are used to support a belief about the actions of the
unknown person, and thus lead to some amount of trust. What about the case in part (b)
of Figure 3.1, where many people are making recommendations about how much to trust
Chuck? In that situation, Alice must compose the information to decide whether or not to
trust Chuck. This composability of trust is another important feature for making trust
computations.
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Figure 3.1: Network Path Structures for Finding Trust. Part (a) shows a simple chain of
people where the transitive features of trust allow Alice to form an opinion of Chuck
based on the information Denise gives to Bob and Bob, in turn, gives to Alice. Part (b)
shows a more complex structure where Alice receives information from two people and
she must come up with an opinion of Chuck by composing the information she has.
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Composability makes sense if we look at trust recommendations as evidence used
to support the belief component of trust. With information from many people, there is
simply more reasoning and justification for the belief. Exactly how Alice should compose
the trust values from many sources is another question. The trust values of each neighbor,
and their recommendations about Chuck, all flow into a composition function that can
vary from situation to situation and person to person. Richardson et al. (2003) used the
concept of an openly defined composition function in their work. In later chapters, this
work will use an analysis of the structure of trust relationships to produce a function that
should return accurate results.
3.2.3   Personalization and Asymmetry
One property of trust that is important in social networks, and which has been
frequently overlooked in the past, is the personalization of trust. Trust is inherently a
personal opinion. Two people often have very different opinions about the
trustworthiness of the same person. For an example, we need only look to politics. In the
United States, when asked "do you trust the current President to effectively lead the
country?" the population will be split – some will trust him very highly, and the others
will have very little trust in his abilities.
The definition of trust includes a belief that the actions of the trusted person will
lead to a good outcome. What qualifies as a good outcome varies from one person to
another. What is a good outcome when the Red Sox are playing the Yankees? The answer
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depends strongly on where a person is from2. For a more immediate example, consider
two sales people bidding on the same contract. What is the "good" action for the contract
manager to take? Again, depending on which sales person is asked, the "good" action will
be different. Since we all have interests, priorities, and opinions that can conflict with the
interests, priorities, and opinions of others, when and how much we trust people will
vary. Since there is rarely an absolute truth, a universal measure of the trustworthiness of
a person is also rare. Calculations about trust must be made from the perspective of the
individual to be of use to them and reflect their interests.
The asymmetry of trust is also important, and it reflects a specific type of
personalization. For two people involved in a relationship, trust is not necessarily
identical in both directions. Because individuals have different experiences,
psychological backgrounds, and histories, it is understandable why two people may trust
each other different amounts. For example, parents and children clearly trust one another
at different levels, since the children are not capable of many tasks. This strong
asymmetry can occur in other relationships where the people involved are on close social
levels. This can be carried out fully to "one-way trust" where circumstances force one
person to trust the other, but there is no reciprocal trust (Hardin, 2002; Cook, 2001).
However, most asymmetry is not as extreme as any of those circumstances. Most trust is
mutual (Hardin, 2002) in that each party has some trust for the other, but there are still
often differences in how much they trust one another. For example, employees typically
say they trust their supervisors more than the supervisors trust the employees. This is
                                                 
2 Actually, I assert that it's always better for the Red Sox to win. There are some absolute truths in this
world.
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seen in a variety of hierarchies (Yaniv, Kleinberger, 2000). Asymmetric trust can arise in
any relationship, and representations of trust relationships in models of social networks
must allow for these differences.
3.3  The Values of Trust
Trust is information about a social relationship and, as such, in a web-based social
network it must be represented as a label on that relationship. There is still much freedom
as to what form that label takes, and this section addresses some of the possible options
for the values representing trust.
In the survey of social networks presented previously, six social networks allow
users to express trust in one way or another. One of them – eCademy – uses the simplest
possible representation of trust. Users have two options: do not make any statement about
trust, or state that a friend is "trusted". This does not allow for any range of
trustworthiness or an expression of untrustworthiness. It simply lets users indicate which
people they trust.
There are some types of relationships that easily fit in this paradigm of simply
existing or not existing. For example, whether or not we are related to a person, if we
have met a person, or if we are co-workers, is a relationship that exists or does not exist.
Trust, however, is not this simple. It is generally established that social trust has a range
of strength (Gambetta, 2000, Marsh, 1992, Marsh 1994). Five WBSNs, shown in Table
3.1, have some notion of trust that is expressed over a range of values. Overstock.com
auctions has been included in this list, although the their "Business Rating and "Personal
Rating" are not explicitly ratings of trust. Ratings in the context of business are similar to
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trust in that they provide information about how much one can trust a person to produce a
good outcome with respect to a business transaction.
Table 3.1: The range of values available for rating trust in web-based social networks.
Website URL Relationship Trust
Values
Overstock
Auctions
http://auctions.overstock.com Business Rating -2 - +2
Personal Rating 0-5
Orkut http://orkut.com Trust 0-3
RepCheck http://repcheck.com Business Trust 0-5
    Personal Trust 0-5
The Trust
Project and
FilmTrust
http://trust.mindswap.org
http://trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust
Trust 1-10
There are other schemes for representing levels of trust, including scales with
more values (such as Richardson et al., (2003) that used a continuous 0-1 range) or with
labels rather than numbers (e.g. "very low trust," "low trust," "moderate trust," "high
trust," and "very high trust"). While there are no web-based social networks currently
using them, there are other possibilities for creating trust information. For example,
ranking systems as opposed to explicit ratings could be used. These could be combined
with preference elicitation mechanisms (Keeney, Raiffa, 1976; Boutilier, et al., 1997) to
build a profile of user's trust. However, the direct rating adopted by all web-based social
networks generally puts less burden on the user and extracts that information more
quickly. The algorithms presented in chapters 4-6 are designed to work with the standard,
explicit rating of trust.
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3.4   Conclusions
This chapter presents a formalization of trust for use in computations in web-
based social networks. Beginning with sociological and psychological background, I
present a definition of social trust tailored for use in web-based social networks. The
functional properties of trust follow from that definition. Computing with trust in social
networks is a burgeoning area of research, and the results of this chapter contribute a
foundation to tie the algorithmic aspects of this work in with the nature of trust.
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Chapter 4
 Inferring Trust: Background and Related Work
With an understanding of web based social networks and how trust functions
within those networks, the goal of this work is to develop algorithms for inferring a trust
value from one person to another when there is not a direct link between them in the
network.
In this chapter, I introduce the fundamental elements of how trust will be
calculated within social networks. The exact algorithms are presented in chapters 5 and 6,
but this discussion shows how the properties of trust and social networks from chapters 2
and 3 relate to and justify the basic elements of the algorithms. This is followed by a
description of the major trust algorithms currently found in the literature, and some
applications that rely upon trust.
4.1  From Trust Properties to Trust Algorithms
Given a social network, information about trust can be provided to users in many
ways. The goal is generally the same: recommend to one node how much to trust another
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node in the network. The way this is done varies (see section 4.2). The goal of the
algorithms in this dissertation is to recommend what trust rating one person might want to
give another, unknown person if there were a connection. The trust recommendations are
very much like predictive recommendations made by a recommender system.
Fitting an algorithm to the task of inferring trust values must be guided by the
properties of trust. Those properties, as presented in Chapter 3, are transitivity,
composability, and personalization.
Trust algorithms can be divided into global and local algorithms. Global
algorithms compute a universal trust value for each person in the network. Regardless of
who asks for a trust recommendation, the same answer is given. On the other hand, local
trust algorithms calculate trust from the perspective of the person asking for the trust
recommendation. Essentially, the results are personalized for each user.
Because trust is personal, and beliefs vary between two people, personalization
(through a local algorithm) should improve the accuracy of the results. If a person wants
a recommendation about how much to trust the President, an algorithm that simply
composes all of the values in the system can be expected to give an answer that falls
almost directly in between "very low trust" and "very high trust". Since most people have
an opinion that leans toward high trust or low trust, this middle rating will not mean
much. It reflects the opinion of the population, and is not a recommendation to the
individual. Our algorithm is based on the perspective of the user. It looks at friends who
the user trusts about their opinions on a topic, the people whom those friends trust, and so
on. Thus, the opinions of people whom the user does not trust much are given very little
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consideration, and the opinions of people whom the user trusts highly are given more
consideration.
Figure 4.1 depicts a sample social network. The solid lines indicate relationships
with trust, and the dashed lines indicate no trust. The node for which we are determining
a trust rating, called the sink, is trusted by two nodes (8 and 9) and not trusted by two
nodes (6 and 7). If a trust rating for the sink were calculated by averaging all of the direct
ratings of the sink, every node would get the same recommendation. However, if we take
into account the information that we know about the structure of the network from the
perspective of each node, a much more informative recommendation can be made.
This will rely on the properties of transitivity and composability. Transitivity
allows information to be passed along paths back to the sink, and composability means
that the source can combine information from many sources. Just how trust is passed
along paths and composed is left out here and will be presented in the next two chapters.
Here, I present only the structural fundamentals of how the process will work.
In the sample network in Figure 4.1, Node 1 can choose to accept information
only from it's trusted neighbors. In the end, only the trust ratings given by Nodes 6 and 7
will propagate back to Node 1. Both 6 and 7 do not trust the sink, and only their opinion
will be passed back to Node 3 and then to Node 1 who will calculate that the sink is not
to be trusted. Similarly, Node 2 also only considers trusted paths. At the end of those
paths, Nodes 8 and 9 both have directly rated the sink to be trustworthy. Their values are
passed back along the network paths through Nodes 4 and 5 to Node 2. Node 2 will
conclude that the sink is to be trusted Thus, if perspective is taken into account, Node 1
and Node 2 can each receive relevant and accurate information about how much to trust
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the sink, even though their opinions are diametrically opposed and the information in the
network is mixed.
Figure 4.1: Finding Trusted Paths to the Sink. Nodes consider ratings from the people
they trust highly (indicated by solid edges). Nodes with low trust ratings (indicated with
dashed edges) are only considered when they are a direct rating of the sink, but are not
used in finding paths to the sink. The ratings made by trusted nodes that directly rated the
sink are used in coming up with a recommendation about how much the source should
trust the sink.
This knowledge about personalization will guide the development of a trust
inference algorithm and the properties of transitivity and composability will form its core.
4.2  Previous work
Determining trust for an unknown entity is  a common problem, even when it is
not directly related to social networks. In this section, I present related work on
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calculating trust with an eye toward how the work relates to and influences the algorithms
that will appear in the following chapters.
4.2.1   Game Theory
Although game theory does not play a large role in this work, it makes up one of
the largest bodies of work on understanding and predicting trust. It would be remiss not
to mention some game theoretic background here.
Game theorists, and particularly those interested in iterated games (games where
players meet many times), are interested in how players can maximize their strategies
based on their knowledge of the previous actions of others. When a game is repeated,
reciprocity becomes an important part of trust.
There are many reciprocity strategies proposed by game theoreticians. The most
widely known of these is the Tit-For-Tat strategy that has been extensively studied in the
context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1984; Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992;
Nowak and Sigmund, 2000, Golbeck, 2002). The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a decision
model. Anecdotally described, two people, indicated here as player 1 and player 2, are
arrested for espionage and placed in separate interrogation rooms. Each player has the
option to cooperate with his peer, or to defect against him. Based on what each player
does, a payoff is awarded (see Table 4.1). When players play the game many times (the
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma), they gain information about the past actions of the other
player, and develop a strategy based on this. If both players trust one another to
cooperate, they earn higher scores. The Tit-For-Tat strategy states that in iteration n, a
player takes the action taken by the opponent in iteration n-1. If the opponent cooperated
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in the previous round, the player will cooperate in the current round. If the opponent
defected, then the player will defect.
Table 4.1: Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma. The payoffs are listed as (player 1,
player 2).
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3,3 5,0
Pl
ay
er
 2
Defect 0,5 1,1
When deciding whether or not to cooperate, it is a benefit to know that your
partner in a game is willing to participate in reciprocative strategies. This leads to
cooperation which, in turn, leads to better outcomes. When deciding whether or not to
trust another person, trustworthy individuals tend to trust others who have a reputation for
being trustworthy and eschew those with weaker reputations (Cosmides and Tooby,
1992). Developing a reputation as someone who is trustworthy is an asset because trust
affects how willing people are to participate in reciprocative interactions (Dasgupta,
2000; Tadelis, 1999), which in turn lead to higher payoffs.
In game theory, learning about the reciprocativeness of a person, and, as a result,
determining the trustworthiness of an individual, is largely based on looking at past
behavior. Using game theoretic principles and models as a background, Miu et al. (2002)
proposed a model for  calculating trust and reputation scores in social networks. A deeper
analysis of to trust in social networks from the game theory perspective is covered in
Buskens (2002).
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The problem with game theoretic models is not their accuracy; indeed, knowledge
about historical interactions can lead to very accurate assumptions about the
trustworthiness of an individual. Rather, the game theoretic approaches rely on that
information about past behavior. That is available in some social networks, but in the
web-based social networks that form the foundation of this dissertation, it is not. The
algorithms used here rely on explicit statements of how much one individual trusts
another, with essentially no knowledge of why that trust was developed, because that is
how relationship information is made available in the medium of WBSNs.
4.2.2  Peer-to-Peer Systems
Trust is also an important issue in peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing network. P2P
systems are similar to social networks in that each peer is connected to the peers with
which it has interacted, and this is a subset of the total number of peers.
Some work (Nejdl, et al., 2004) has adopted the term to describe access control
policies; an agent would be trusted to  access information if it can provide information
showing that it meets the requirements set forth in the access control policy. However,
the applications of trust that are more relevant to this work are those that use it for
reputation management. For a P2P system to work, each node must correctly implement
the network protocols and provide access to uncorrupted files. If a node is not reliable, it
can degrade the usefulness of the entire network. Thus, the "trustworthiness" of a node
can be measured as how well it participates in the P2P network.
Several projects have addressed the issue of inferring trust for an unknown node
in P2P systems, so bad nodes can be filtered out of the active group of peers.
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The EigenTrust algorithm (Kamvar et al., 2003) considers trust as a function of
corrupt vs. valid files that the node provides. A peer maintains information about the
trustworthiness of peers with which it has interacted based on the proportion of good files
it has received from that peer.  For one peer to determine the trustworthiness of  another
with which it has not interacted, it needs to gather information from the network and infer
the trustworthiness. The EigenTrust algorithm calculates trust with a variation on the
PageRank algorithm (Page et al., 1998), used by Google for rating the relevance of web
pages to a search. A peer creates a direct trust rating for another peer based on its
historical performance. In its simple form, the algorithm uses a matrix representation of
the trust values within the system and over a series of iterations it converges to a globally
accepted trust rating of each peer. Because of safeguards built into the system,
EigenTrust has been shown to be highly resistant to attack.
Another approach to reputation and trust management in Peer-2-Peer systems
determines trust through the past behavior of a peer. The focus of that work is on how to
share trust assessments in a distributed way (Aberer and Despotovic 2001, Lee et al.,
2003).
There is a fundamental difference between trust in P2P networks and trust in
social networks. P2P trust is based on the reliability of a node to adhere to absolute
correct parameters. A file is either corrupted or it is not. There is not a "sort of corrupted"
file. A node properly implements a protocol or it does not. Again, there is no in-between.
In social networks, though, trust is not based on this absolute truth. Two people may hold
vastly different opinions about a topic (look only to religion or politics for extreme
examples), and there is no absolute truth to determine which one should be trusted and
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which one should not. A person decides how much to trust another based on personal
opinion. The universal truth in P2P networks is a benefit for making trust calculations
because the information provided by one peer reflects the truth of all peers. The need for
a trust rating personalized to each node is minimized because one peer can expect to have
the same experience as every other peer.
4.2.3  Calculating Trust on the Web
On the web, "trust" has largely been an issue of security, authentication, and
digital signatures. However, work has also focused on using the more social aspects of
trust.
Advogato is a website, at http://advogato.org, that serves as a community
discussion board and resource for free software developers. It also is the testbed for Raph
Levin's trust metrics research (Levin, 1998). Each user on the site has a single trust rating
calculated from the perspective of designated seeds (authoritative nodes). Trust
calculations are made using a network flow model. His metric composes certifications
between members to determine the trust level of a person, and thus their membership
within a group. Users can be certified at three levels: apprentice, journeyer, and master.
Access to post and edit website information is controlled by these certifications. Like
EigenTrust, the Advogato metric is quite attack resistant. By identifying individual nodes
as "bad" and finding any nodes that certify the "bad" nodes, the metric cuts out an
unreliable portion of the network. Calculations are based primarily on the good nodes, so
the network as a whole remains secure. Because of its use of groups to determine who
can post messages, Advogato is called a group trust metric. It is also a global trust
algorithm because the same seeds are used to make calculations for every user. A
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common alteration to Advogato sets the user as the single seed, thus converting it to a
local metric with personalized calculations.
Ziegler and Lausen (2004a) propose a trust algorithm called Appleseed. Like
Advogato, it is a group trust metric. However, instead of using maximum flow, the basic
intuition is motivated by spreading activation strategies. Like EigenTrust, Appleseed is
based on finding the principal eigenvector. It is a local trust metric, and given a network
and a source it returns a ranking of all the nodes in the network.
Richardson et al.(2003) use social networks with trust to calculate the belief a user
may have in a statement. This is done by finding paths (either through enumeration or
probabilistic methods) from the source to any node which represents an opinion of the
statement in question, concatenating trust values along the paths to come up with the
recommended belief in the statement for that path, and aggregating those values to come
up with a final trust value for the statement. Current social network systems on the Web,
however, primarily focus on trust values between one user to another, and thus their
aggregation function would require some modification to be applied in these systems.
Their paper intentionally does not define a specific concatenation function for calculating
trust between individuals, opting instead to present a general framework as their main
result. To test their algorithms, they do choose a concatenation function (multiplication)
and show accuracy results using the Epinions network. Grishchenko (2004) discusses
some issues and potential applications related to the work from Richardson and others.
One problem that arises in algorithms that are based on finding the principal
eigenvector, like Kamvar (2003), Zeigler and Lausen (2004), and Richardson et al.,
(2003), is that trust must first be normalized to work within the matrix. This means that
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the normalized trust value from a person who has made many trust ratings will be lower
than  if only one or two people had been rated. However, socially, trust is not a finite
resource; it is possible to have very high trust for a large number of people, and that trust
is not any weaker than the trust held by a person who only trusts one or two others.
Some work has also looked at whether distrust can be propagated and inferred
like trust (Guha, et al. 2003). They convert continuous ratings to binary values
representing trust and distrust. They observed a relatively low error rate in their
calculations. In Chapter 5, Inferring Trust in Binary Trust Networks, I presents some
theoretical foundations that speak to why the binary system may be partially responsible
for these results.
It is worth mentioning that Richardson, et al. (2003) and  Guha, et al. (2004) both
used Epinions as a testbed network. This network does not qualify as a web-based social
network based on the definition given in Chapter 2 because the trust ratings are not an
expression of the trust in a social relationship. The Epinions web of trust has no
expectation that a social relationship exists between trusted people, but simply that one
person values the opinions of another. Even without this unsatisfied criterion, there are
other issues3 with the Epinions network that make it less than optimal for the type of
analysis presented in this dissertation.
                                                 
3 These include the fact that distrust is not displayed, so the public network is only made up of "trust"
relationships or no relationships.
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4.2.4   Public Key Infrastructure
Work in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) uses trust in a similar way to social
networks. Mapping a name to a public key or, conversely, to finding the public key of a
particular user is an important task for executing secure transactions. When there is no
centralized authority to map keys and names, this sort of authentication can be done by
combining information from a path of authorities. These chains can suffer if any of the
intermediate authorities have poor information. Trust values between authorities can be
combined over paths to determine confidence in the authority at the end point. While the
concept of trust in these systems does not match exactly with the definition presented in
chapter 3, the approaches to combining trust are very similar. Metrics for calculating trust
over paths have been presented in Tarah and Huitema (1992), Beth et al. (1994), Mendes
and Huitema (1995), Maurer (1996), and Reiter and Stubblebine (1998) to name a few.
The inputs and outputs of these metrics vary, and some do not translate well to
use in social networks. For example, Maurer (1996) makes calculations using several
features in addition to trust. Confidence ratings are combined with explicit statements of
trust and authenticity measures to infer authenticity information. On the other hand, some
metrics can be directly applied to trust in social networks. Beth, Borcherding, and Klein's
metric (1994) is more directly applicable to web-based social networks. It takes a
network with trust values on a [0,1] scale, a source, and a sink as input, and produces a
calculated trust value as output. In chapter 6, their algorithm will be compared with
TidalTrust, my algorithm for inferring trust values.
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4.3   Conclusions
With an understanding of social networks on the web and the definition and
functional properties of trust, we can move toward creating algorithms to infer trust
relationships in web-based social networks. That first requires an understanding of how
the properties of trust translate into algorithms. In this chapter, I have given insights into
how personalization guides the decision to create a local algorithm, as opposed to a
global one, and provided a general overview of how trust will need to be calculated over
paths and composed into a single value.
Making calculations about trust are important in many spaces, within and outside
of social networks. I presented an overview of the trust-related literature in game theory,
peer-to-peer networks, web-based social networks, and the public key infrastructure, and
described where lessons can be borrowed for inclusion in the algorithms that will be
presented in the next chapters, and when information needed in other areas of research
prevents a direct translation to use in web-based social networks.
With this information as a background, it is possible to start developing
algorithms for computing trust. The next two chapters will introduce two algorithms for
making these calculations in networks with binary and continuous trust values.
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Chapter 5
Inferring Trust in Binary Trust Networks
There is a wide range of values that can be used for rating how much one person
trusts another. The simplest of these rating schemes is a voting system; a person would
rate someone as either "trusted" or "not trusted". While many of the subtleties of trust are
lost with such a coarse rating system, it also simplifies the analysis of the algorithms. As
such, it is a good starting place for developing the foundations of algorithms that will be
used with finer grained rating systems.
This chapter presents two variations on a simple algorithm for inferring trust in
binary-valued trust networks. The accuracy of the algorithms, determined by how
frequently the inferred values agree with the actual trust values assigned by a node, are
analyzed both theoretically and in simulation. The results show that in this system, the
algorithms described here can produce highly accurate results. This will serve as the
foundation for eventually developing algorithms that work with more complex trust
ratings.
57
5.1  Generating Social Networks
To test algorithms for inferring trust, there must be networks for testing. Naturally
occurring networks take a long time to develop, and the topological properties are fixed.
To experiment with making trust inferences on networks with various properties, it is
necessary to be able to automatically generate network models.
5.1.1  Building Networks with Correct Topology
It has been widely documented that social networks have the properties of small
world networks (Watts, 1999). The properties of graph structure that define a small world
network are connectance and average path length. Connectance (indicated by the variable
γ) is the property of clustering in neighborhoods: given a node n, connectance is the
fraction of edges between neighbors of n that actually exist compared to the total number
of possible edges. Small world graphs have strong connectance. The average shortest
path length between nodes(indicated with variable L) grows logarithmically with the size
of the graph in small world networks.
The one difference between the networks in this research and traditional complex
systems is that our network has directed edges. Although the L and γ values are usually
calculated with undirected edges, they can easily be calculated with directed edges. The
shortest path is calculated by following edges and respecting their direction. Connectance
is calculated with twice as many possible edges, since any pair of nodes has two possible
directed edges than can connect them.
The work by Watts and Strogatz (Watts, Strogatz, 1998) showed that graphs with
small world properties can be generated by randomly rewiring a small number of nodes
in a regular graph, like a lattice. The variable p indicates what percentage of edges should
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be randomly selected, removed, and randomly reconnected As p increases the average
path length drops off quickly. The average connectance, on the other hand, remains high
until p gets too large. Creating a lattice and choosing a p that produces a graph with high
connectance and low average path length will produce a small world graph. This model,
called the ß-model (Watts, 1999) has been shown to successfully emulate the structure of
several common social networks, including the co-authorship graph and co-actor graph
(Davis et al., 2003; Foster et al., 1963; Newman, 2001;Watts, 1999).
We used a the ß-model to create graphs for use in the analysis of the accuracy of
algorithms that are presented in section 4. The p value varied depending on the size and
average degree of our graphs. We verified for each graph size and average degree that the
p value produced graphs with L and γ values consistent with small world graphs.
5.1.2 Adding Trust Ratings to Graphs
The edges in the generated graphs represent connections between individuals. To
generate a trust network, those edges must be augmented with values representing the
trust relationship between individuals. This section describes the process of adding trust
ratings into a generated graph.
One node in the network is randomly chosen as the source. We then give each
remaining node a "true" rating. This rating says whether the node is trustworthy (good) or
not trustworthy (bad) according to the source. The number of good and bad nodes are
assigned at a pre-determined ratio, and have two properties. First, this true value is
treated as the source's opinion of the node, as though an all-knowing oracle could tell
whether or not the source would consider this node was good or bad if there were an
established relationship. The second property determined by the good/bad rating is the
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node's behavior. Good nodes agree with the source with a certain probability, while bad
nodes always vote incorrectly; the bad nodes will say every good node is bad and every
bad node is good.
It is important to note here that we are not studying the behavior of the nodes in
the network to try to identify "good" or "bad" nodes. Clearly, with bad nodes always
voting opposite the source, they would be relatively easy to track down. The bad nodes
represent attackers – nodes that may be incorrectly called trustworthy, and can then
corrupt the system. While the behavior in these simulations – always assigning incorrect
values – is worse than we would expect from an attacker in an actual network, it allows
us to perform a worst-case analysis of our algorithm since the true value allows us to
determine if our inference was correct or incorrect.
Once each node has been given its true value, the trust ratings on the edges are
assigned. Bad nodes rate every neighbor opposite its true value. Good nodes rate each
neighbor correctly with a certain probability. For example, if we specify that the good
nodes are accurate 70% of the time, each neighbor is rated independently with a rating
corresponding to the true value with probability 0.7
5.2  Making Trust Inferences
In developing the networks described in the previous section, several properties
have been identified: the trust value from one node to another, "good" and "bad" nodes,
the notion of a "true" value for a node from the perspective of another, and the accuracy
of ratings. In this section, two variations on a simple algorithm are introduced. A
statistical analysis of their performance is complemented by an experimental analysis on
generated social networks. These results show that in reasonable conditions the
60
algorithms are able to produce accurate inferences, often improving on the initial
accuracy in the system.
5.2.1  A Rounding Algorithm
In this algorithm, the source polls each of the neighbors to which it has given a
positive reputation rating. Neighbors with zero ("no trust") ratings are ignored, since their
reputation means that they give unreliable information. Recall that a zero, or "no trust"
rating does not mean distrust; it simply means that information from the non-trusted
person cannot be relied upon to be accurate. Since we do not want information from
nodes that are not trusted, paths through these nodes are not included. Only paths through
trusted neighbors are considered.
Each of the source’s trusted neighbors will return their rating for the sink. The
source will then average these ratings and round the final value. This rounded value is the
inferred reputation rating from source to sink.
Each of the source’s neighbors will use this same process to come up with their
reputation ratings for the sink– if there is a direct edge connecting them to the sink, the
value of that edge is used; otherwise, the value is inferred. As shown in Figure 5.1, if a
node is encountered in two paths from source to sink, it is considered in each path. Node
B and C will both return ratings calculated through D. When a reputation rating from D is
first requested, D will average the ratings from E and F. The value is then cached at D, so
that the second time D’s reputation rating is needed, no calculations are necessary.
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of how nodes are used in the inference from node A to node G
5.2.2  Non-Rounding Algorithm
We altered the algorithm presented above by removing the rounding performed
by each node before it returns a value. The only rounding is made in one final step, added
to the end of the algorithm, where the original source rounds the average of the values
returned by its neighbors, so the final inferred value is 0 or 1. Ratings are still assigned as
1 or 0 values (trusted or not trusted). With the algorithmic change, however, intermediate
nodes on the path from source to sink return values in the range of [0,1] instead of
returning rounded {0,1} values. Accuracy was determined by taking the difference
between the rounded final inferred value and the true value.
5.2.3 Analysis of the Algorithms
There are two variables in the network – percentage of good nodes, g, and the
accuracy, pa, of good nodes. When a node gives an inaccurate rating, it may rate a good
node as "not trusted", or rate a bad node as "trusted". This causes a problem because good
nodes may be ignored, since information from nodes with zero-ratings is ignored, or,
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more profoundly, a large amount of incorrect information can be introduced into the
calculations when a bad node is incorrectly rated as "trusted".
The overall accuracy of the direct ratings initially assigned in the network is given
by g*pa. We call this the initial accuracy in the network and represent this with the
variable a. Figure 5.2 illustrates the initial accuracy as these two parameters are varied.
Note that the initial accuracy is a measure of how frequently the direct ratings of people
in the network agree with the true value according to the source. It is not a measure of
how accurate a person's ratings are with respect to their own beliefs.
Figure 5.2: A map of how the initial accuracy in the system changes with g and pa.
By design in these algorithms, a node will make a correct inference if the majority
of its neighbors return the correct rating for the sink. Since the bad nodes are always
incorrect, the accuracy of the good nodes must compensate to obtain a correct inference
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from a majority vote. Thus, to obtain a correct inference, the initial accuracy must be at
least 0.5.
Let a = g * pa. For a given graph with n nodes, the probability that the majority of
the nodes will correctly rate the sink is given by a binomial distribution.
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The binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with a
mean centered at a. The Central Limit Theorem says that as n increases, the binomial
distribution gets closer and closer to a normal distribution. That is, the binomial
probability of any event approaches the normal probability of the same event. As n
increases, the standard deviation of the normal distribution decreases, making a narrower
curve, and thus the probability that a majority of nodes make correct recommendations is
closer to the mean a. Thus, for a > 0.5, the probability that the mean is greater than 0.5,
and ergo the inference is correct approaches 1. Similarly, for a<0.5, the probability of a
correct inference goes to 0.
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Thus, if nodes are accurate at least half of the time, the probability that the
recommendation is correct goes to 1. This is a critical point. As long as g * pa is greater
than half, we can expect to have a highly accurate inference.
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This analysis describes one step of rounding. With the non-rounding algorithm,
where only the final inferred value is rounded, this analysis applies. In the rounding
algorithm, where the average trust value is rounded at each step, the accuracy increases at
each step. As the algorithm moves up from the immediate neighbors of the sink toward
the source, a will vary from node to node, but it will increase at each level. Figure 5.3
illustrates this point where the network starts with all good nodes, accurate in 70% of
their classifications. After moving up three levels from the sink, the accuracy of the
inference will be approximately 96%.
Figure 5.3:  The increasing probability of a correct trust inference. This figure shows a
simple network and demonstrates the increasing probability of accuracy. Beginning with
a uniform accuracy of 0.7, the probability of properly classifying the sink increases as we
move up the search tree from sink to source. After only three levels, this source has a
96% chance of properly classifying the sink.
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This analysis suggests that the rounding algorithm will outperform the non-
rounding algorithm. The non-rounding algorithm is an important intermediate step
between a system with binary ratings and a system with continuous values. Since
continuous values are used in the intermediate steps between source and sink, this
algorithm nearly replicates what would be used when users assign values in a broader
range. The analysis here not only shows that the final-step rounding gives good results,
but also that accuracy is not lost when the internal rounding is eliminated. Future work
will address the shift to a system with continuous values and how a slight variation on the
non-rounding algorithm can be effective in such a network.
5.2.4  Simulations
When inferring the trust rating for a node, the accuracy of the inference is
determined by comparing the inferred value to the true value. The simulations presented
in this section support the theoretical analysis presented in section 4.3; for both the
rounding and non-rounding algorithms, the inferred trust rating is more accurate than the
accuracy of the initial trust ratings in the network.
Starting at 0.025 and using increments of 0.025, there are 1,600 pairs (g, pa). For
each (g, pa) pair we generated 1,000 small-world graphs using the ß-model described
above. In those graphs, the source and sink were randomly chosen. The trust inference
from source to sink made on each graph was checked against the true value of the sink.
This experiment was repeated for graphs with 400, 800, and 1600 nodes. Similar results
were found for each graph size.
Beginning with the rounding algorithm, experiments showed that the accuracy of
the inferred rating was significantly higher than then initial accuracy in the network from
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the good nodes (pa) and the percentage of good nodes (g). Figure 5.4 shows data for the
inferred accuracy using the rounding algorithm on a set of graphs with 400 nodes and an
average degree of 16. While the initial accuracy of ratings decreases linearly, the
accuracy of the inferred ratings remains higher.
Figure 5.4: A comparison of the initial accuracy of trust ratings with the accuracy of
inferred ratings using the rounding algorithm for n=400, d=16, g=0.9, and a variable pa.
In most simulations, the accuracy of a recommendation remains high relative to
the initial accuracy until pa*g nears 0.5. This is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: The accuracy of inferred ratings are shown for various initial percentages of
good nodes.
The non-rounding algorithm produced results inline with the theoretical analysis.
Even without the intermediate rounding, the inferred values were more accurate than the
initial accuracy in the system. The results are less dramatic than for the rounding
algorithm, but Figures 5.6 and 5.7 shows that the increased accuracy is still present.
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy of Recommendations Compared to Initial Accuracy Using Non-
Rounding Algorithm. This figure shows that for a>0.5, the inferred accuracy using the
non-rounding algorithm is higher than the accuracy of the initial ratings. This is the same
effect seen in Figure 5.4 for the rounding algorithm.
  
Figure 5.7: Accuracy of Recommendations Using Rounding Algorithm. This figure
shows the accuracy of inferred trust values using the non-rounding algorithm for a range
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of g and pa values. Though less pronounced than the results for the rounding algorithm
shown in Figure 5.5, we can see that the results follow a similar pattern of remaining
higher than the a value for a>0.5 and lower for a<0.5.
To directly compare the two algorithms, Figure 5.8 shows the accuracy of both
the rounding and non-rounding algorithms together for g=1 and g=0.9 with pa >0.5.
Figure 5.8: A comparison of the accuracy of trust inferences made with the rounding and
non-rounding algorithms.
The results in Figure 5.8 are drawn from simulations on 400 node networks with
average degree of sixteen. The performance follows a similar pattern for both algorithms
and both g values. As the theoretical results would indicate, the rounding algorithm
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outperforms the non-rounding algorithm for both g values because the rounding at each
step removes more error than is rounded out in the final step of the non-rounding
algorithm.
5.3  Conclusions
The analysis and experimental results show that the algorithms presented in this
chapter can produce accurate trust inferences when the initial accuracy in the social
network is greater than 0.5. These algorithms could be directly applied in social networks
that use binary trust ratings, such as AllConsuming.net or Epinions. They also provide a
foundation for extending the algorithms to continuous rating systems, which is presented
in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Inferring Trust in Continuous Trust Networks: TidalTrust
Although some systems may choose to use a binary trust rating system, a larger
range of values more accurately reflects the nuances of social trust. Most web-based
social networks that implement trust ratings use a range of values. To move from an
algorithm that works well in a binary rating system to one that works well with a more
continuous set of ratings, an understanding of how these values are patterned in actual
social networks is necessary. This chapter presents two naturally developed social
networks with trust ratings with an analysis of how trust behaves in that network. This
information is used to ground the development of new functions for composing trust
values to replace the simpler algorithms used in the previous chapter. An algorithm for
calculating these trust recommendations in networks with continuous values, called
TidalTrust, is described and analyzed in detail in section 6.3.
72
6.1  Experimental Networks
The quality of trust inference algorithms in this work is determined by measuring
their accuracy. To do that, it is necessary to have real networks on which to test the data.
As part of the trust-related projects in this work, two separate trust networks have been
grown from scratch.
The first network is part of the Trust Project at http://trust.mindswap.org/. This
network is built up from distributed data maintained on the Semantic Web. Within their
FOAF files, users include trust ratings for people they know using the FOAF Trust
Module, a simple ontology for expressing trust developed as part of this project. The
ontology has vocabulary for rating people on a scale of 1 (low trust) to 10 (high trust).
These ratings can be made in general or with respect to a specific topic. In the network
built up for study in this research, users assigned general ratings to one another.
Because the network is built up from files that are distributed across the web, the
size varies depending on which files can be accessed at the time a model is built. On
average, there are about 2,000 members with over 2,500 connections. Figure 6.1 shows
the current structure of this network.
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Figure 6.1: The structure of the Trust Project's network.
The second network is part of the FilmTrust project, a website that combines
social networks with a movie ratings and reviews site. More information about the
network is described in Chapter 7.
The site currently comprises 300 members who have rated each others'
trustworthiness on a scale of 1-10. Figure 6.2 illustrates the topology of the network.
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Figure 6.2: The structure of the FilmTrust social network.
In this network, users rate how much they trust people about movies. Since all of
the ratings are specific to movies, they can be composed in the same way as the
generalized ratings of the Trust Project. This would not be possible if some trust ratings
were assigned in general and others were specific to movies, because the arguments about
transitivity and composability would not hold.
Both of these networks use a scale of 1-10, which comprises 10 discrete values,
rather than a continuous range of values. This is an artifact of the human interface. The
average web user is more comfortable working in a scale like this as opposed to assigning
ratings, say, in the range of 0 to 1. These discrete values also make it easier to categorize
and analyze results. While it is not totally continuous, it offers a range of values that
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approximates a continuous system closely enough that we do not expect it will affect the
results.
6.2   Patterns of Trust Values
In the previous chapter, two variations on an algorithm for inferring trust were
introduced. Some of the choices in this algorithm were simple to make.
 Composing Values: Because the ratings were binary, neighbors were either trusted or
not trusted. Information from the untrusted neighbors could just be ignored, since it is
not logical to incorporate information from an untrusted source. On the other hand, all
of the trusted neighbors are trusted equally, so all of their information can be accepted
equally. Since there is nothing to distinguish one trusted neighbor from another, each
neighbor's information is given equal weight when composing the values into an
average.
 Transitivity and Paths in the Network: The social network models in the previous
chapter were uniform in how likely it was that a good node would give a rating that
agreed with the source node. This essentially took the worst case for accuracy and
applied it uniformly in the network. Nodes that were closer to the source were not
considered to be any more accurate than nodes far from the source. This worst-case
analysis was easier to conduct, and still yielded good results. If it were the case that
nodes closer to the source were more accurate, the quality of the results would only
improve.
When working with a continuous scale, these facets of the algorithm need to be
adjusted in a way that will ensure the accuracy of the results. This requires an analysis of
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the structure and trust topology of the network. The results in this section are primarily
drawn from the larger Trust Project network.
6.2.1  Distribution of Trust Values
When discussing binary trust networks, the variable g indicated the proportion of
trusted nodes in the network. When using a continuous scale of trust values, there is a
distribution that measures the percentage of nodes for a given trust value.
In the networks used for these results, users employed a 1-10 scale with discrete
integer values. As such, there is not a smooth distribution. Although one might expect the
average trust rating to be 5, the middle value, this turns out not to be the case. The
average trust rating is 7.25, with a standard deviation of 2.30 in the Trust Project network
(used in the following examples), and 6.8 with a standard deviation of 2.1 in the
FilmTrust network . Figure 6.3 shows the full distribution of trust values in the Trust
Project network. In the network, there were 2,231 ratings assigned. The distribution has
been scaled to show what proportion of the total number was comprised by each
individual rating.
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Figure 6.3: The distribution of trust ratings in the Trust Project network.
The distribution of the trust ratings is skewed toward the higher values which is
logical in the social context. Users choose the people with whom they form social
connections, and it is reasonable that people are more likely to connect with people they
trust highly than people for whom they have little trust.
6.2.2  Correlation of Trust and Accuracy
The networks used in the previous chapter were designed to have untrusted nodes
behave in a way that was incongruous with the opinions of the source node, and trusted
nodes to behave reliability with some probability. In networks with continuous ratings, it
is less obvious how trust ratings relate to accuracy.
To investigate this, experiments were performed on the Trust Project network.
The goal was to ascertain if individuals with higher trust ratings were more likely to be
accurate. This was determined repeating the following process for each node. First, a
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node was chosen as the source. For each neighbor of the source, ni, a list of common
neighbors of the source and ni was compiled.  For each of those common neighbors, the
difference between the source's rating and ni's rating was recorded as a measure of
accuracy. A smaller difference means a higher accuracy. This difference was recorded
along with the source's rating of ni. Figure 6.4 illustrates one step in the process.
Figure 6.4: Finding points of comparison in the network.  In these experiments, this
network would produce two data points: the difference between the source and N1's
ratings of N2 (in this case, 1) and the difference between the source and N1's ratings of N3
(in this case, 0)
These experiments produced a pair of numbers for each data point: the trust value
from the source to its neighbor (n1), and the difference between the ratings of a common
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neighbor. The number of data points for each trust value indicates how frequently
common neighbors are shared between pairs of nodes at each trust level.
As shown in figure 6.5, the frequency of common neighbors among pairs of nodes
with high trust levels is much higher than the frequency of those ratings in the original
network. These indicate that people with stronger trust connections share more common
social connections than is proportional. In fact, over 40% of the common neighbors were
found between nodes that shared a high trust rating. If the experimental results show that
the results are more accurate when there is more trust, this distribution means that a the
increased accuracy will be reinforced by the increased frequency of common neighbors
among pairs with high trust.
Figure 6.5: Distribution of trust ratings in the original network, and in the data points of
the experiments.
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If individuals with higher trust ratings agree with the source more, we would
expect average difference (∆) would decrease as trust ratings increase. Table 6.1 presents
the actual data from these experiments. Note that there are very few comparisons for
Trust Ratings 1-5. Because the number of comparisons for the lower trust ratings is so
small, and the margin of error so large, these data points were not included in the analysis
here. Instead, we focused on the comparisons made for trust values 6-10.
Table 6.1: Data from experiments run to determine accuracy.
Trust Rating Number of
Comparisons
Average
Difference (∆)
1 2 0
2 1 6
3 1 9
4 5 3.6
5 1 5
6 46 1.7
7 85 1.5
8 178 1.25
9 176 1.05
10 371 0.95
 As Figure 6.6 and Table 6.1 indicate, there appears to be a strong linear
relationship between trust value and ∆. This is confirmed by the statistics; the Pearson's
correlation is greater than –0.991, indicating that there is an almost perfect negative linear
relationship between the variables.
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Figure 6.6: The relationship between ∆ and Trust Rating.
An ANOVA (shown in Table 6.2) using the full set of data points confirms that
accuracy changes significantly as trust changes. The null hypothesis is that there is no
significant difference in accuracy among the categories of trust values; probability of this
ANOVA result assuming the null hypothesis is less than 0.001. Thus, we can conclude
that accuracy is significantly better as trust values increase.
Table 6.2: ANOVA Analysis of the results in Table 6.1.
Does the social trust between individuals lead to the smaller ∆ as trust ratings
increase? It is possible that the correlation could it be a result of the underlying structure
Source of
Variation
Sum of
Squares
d.f. Mean F
between 39.49 4 9.871 6.475
error 1229 806 1.525
total 1268 810
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of the network or the distribution of trust values. To test this, the trust values in the
network were randomized. The topology of the network was not altered – each person
was connected to the same people – and the distribution of trust ratings was also not
changed. The values were just assigned to random edges. This maintains the features of
the network while removing the social trust component; the values on the edges no longer
represent the actual trust between people.
Several new networks were created with different randomizations of the values
within the network. The same experiment described above was conducted on each
randomized network. Figure 6.7 shows the average ∆ for each trust rating in the
randomized networks, as well as the results from the original network. It shows that for
each trust value, the ∆ value is much higher in the randomized networks. Furthermore,
the relationship between trust rating and ∆ is less apparent. An ANOVA was run on these
data, and the probability of the result shown in Table 6.3 assuming the null hypothesis –
that there is no statistically significant difference among the trust values – is 0.42. Thus,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Figure 6.7: Average ∆  by trust value for the original social network data and the
randomized data.
Table 6.3. ANOVA Analysis of Randomized Network Results
Source of
Variation
Sum of
Squares
d.f. Mean F
between 17.66 4 4.415 0.9722
error 8328 --- 4.541  
total 8345 ---    
As one final piece of evidence, the proportion of common neighbors found for
each trust value is quite different than is seen in the original network with actual data.
Figure 6.8 shows trust distributions overall in the network, among pairs of nodes with
common neighbors in the experiments with the original network, and among pairs of
nodes with common neighbors in the experiments with the randomized networks.
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Figure 6.8: Trust distributions in the original network and experiments on the original and
randomized networks.
Unlike in the experiments on the original network where there was a sharp
increase in the frequency of high trust values among the data points, there is no such
increase in the randomized networks. In fact, the frequency of trust values among the
pairs with common neighbors in randomized networks follows the distribution in the
network as a whole quite closely. Figure 6.9 shows this more closely.
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of trust ratings in the original network and among the pairs with
common neighbors in the randomized networks.
These analyses show that in this trust network, there is more agreement between
nodes connected by high trust ratings than nodes connected by lower trust ratings.
Furthermore,  common neighbors are found more frequently among pairs of nodes with
higher trust ratings. Thus, the increased accuracy among highly trusted neighbors is
amplified by the increased frequency of receiving data from those highly trusted
neighbors.
If this analysis is carried out fully, we can predict the overall expected accuracy.
The ∆ for each trust value is multiplied by the frequency that value appears in the
experiments. As Table 6.4 shows, the expected ∆ in the actual network is almost half
what it is in the randomized networks.  The lower ∆ is synonymous with higher accuracy,
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and these results show that the structure and trust topology of the network lead to higher
accuracy among highly trusted neighbors, and higher accuracy overall.
Table 6.4: Expected ∆ in original and randomized networks
Trust Rating ∆ * Frequency of occurrence
in Original Network
∆ * Frequency of occurrence
in Randomized Networks
1 0.000 0.125
2 0.007 0.034
3 0.010 0.072
4 0.021 0.029
5 0.006 0.257
6 0.090 0.240
7 0.147 0.410
8 0.257 0.551
9 0.214 0.383
10 0.408 0.490
Overall
Expected ∆ 1.117 2.073
These elements will become a critical in the development of the new trust
inference algorithm.
6.2.3  Path Length and Accuracy
The length of a path is determined by the number of edges the source must cross
before reaching the sink. For example, sourcen1sink has length two. This is length
used to determine the correlation between trust value and accuracy. For that analysis, the
common neighbors approach was a natural fit. To study the relationship between path
length and accuracy, it is reasonable to try to follow a similar approach. Paths of length,
2, 3, 4…n from the source to a node that is also a neighbor of the source would be
compiled, and the difference between the source's rating, the rating from the last node in
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the path would be analyzed with respect to the trust values along that path. For example,
paths where each node is connected to the next with a trust rating of 10 may be expected
to be more accurate than paths where nodes are connected with lower trust values.
However, certain properties of social networks make this a more complex
analysis. Figure 6.10 depicts the types of paths that would be used for this analysis. The
path through Node A has only one intermediate node, and this is length of the paths used
in the previous section. The path with two intermediate nodes goes through nodes B1 and
B2. It is important in this path that the source must not be connected to node B2.  If there
is a connection there, then the path really only has one intermediate node (source  B2
  sink), with B1 as a meaningless placeholder. Similarly, for the path with three
intermediate nodes represented in Figure 6.10 by the Cis, the source cannot be connected
to C2 or C3 because it would essentially shorten the actual path length being analyzed.
Also, C1 cannot connect to C3 for the same reason because it would skip the intermediate
node that completes the path.
The small world properties of the network affect the effectiveness of this analysis.
Recall that connectance of a node is the ratio of how many of the nodes neighbors are
connected to one another versus how many possible connections can be made.
Essentially, this is a coefficient of how closely connected members of a neighborhood
are. In small world networks, including most social networks, connectance is quite high
relative to what would be expected in a random network. In the Trust Project social
network, the connectance is greater than 0.66, meaning about 2/3 of possible connections
between neighbors of a node exist.
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Figure 6.10. Paths from the source to sink of length two (through Node A), three (through
the B nodes), and four (through the C nodes). The source must not have connections to
any nodes in this figure other than those shown because it would create a shorter path
through the additional edge.
When looking for longer paths, the source must choose two of its neighbors (call
them n1 and n2) who are not directly connected. The connectance statistic of 0.66 for this
network means that, on average, only 1/3 of the possible neighbor pairs are not directly
connected. To make a path of length 3, there must be one node (say n3)that connects n1
and n2. Since n3 and the source are unconnected neighbors of n2, they are one of the 1/3 of
n2's neighbor pairs. If n1 and n2 are also used to find a path of length 4, there will have to
be another node adjacent to n2 that is not adjacent to the source, and not adjacent to n3.
That adds another two unconnected pairs to the neighborhood of n2. Similarly, the
number of unconnected neighbor pairs of n1 will also increase.
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However, because of the high connectance, there can only be a limited number of
unconnected neighbor pairs. This limits the number of paths that can be found, and as the
length of the path increases, the number of unconnected neighbor-pairs increases linearly.
This is illustrated in figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11. Paths of length 2, 3, 4, and 5,. The dashed lines indicate edges that cannot
exist because they would shorten the path. As the number of nodes in the path increases,
so do the number of edges that must be excluded.
The average degree in the network is 3.19. With an average connectance of 0.66,
that means that in the average case only about one pair of neighbors can be lacking an
edge between them. Of course, there is variance within the network; some nodes have
many more neighbors (standard deviation on the average degree is 4.28) and others have
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a different connectance (standard deviation is 0.508). However, these properties limit the
length and number of paths that can be used for a common neighbor's style analysis.
Data from the experiments to calculate the effect of trust provide an opportunity
to estimate the effect of length on accuracy. As described in the previous section, for
every pair of nodes with a common neighbor in the network, the difference between their
ratings of the common neighbor was recorded along with the trust rating between nodes
in the pair.
To approximate the effect of length, we use those datasets. Consider a path of
length three: sourcen1n2sink. There are two variables that must be controlled for a
path this length: the trust from the source to n1 (ts,n1)and the trust from n1 to n2(tn1,n2). Once
those two values are fixed, the final rating, from n2 to the sink, is the used to determine ∆.
We will write this as a delta for the path ts,n2-tn1,n2. Based on the trust rating from the
source to n1, we can retrieve the set of ∆ values calculated used in the analysis done in
section 6.2.1. Similarly, for the trust rating from n1 to n2 there is a corresponding set of ∆
values. Those can be combined to produce an estimated average ∆(or )for the longer path.
For each ∆ in the data set corresponding to the trust value from source to n1 (call
this ∆s,n1) the value represents two possibilities: n1's rating for the common neighbor was
higher than the source's rating, or it was lower.  For each of those two we look at each ∆
value corresponding to the  trust value from n1 to n2 (call this ∆n1,n2 ) That leads to a total
of four possibilities: ∆s,n1 and positive ∆n1,n2, positive  ∆s,n1  and negative ∆n1,n2 , negative
∆s,n1  and positive ∆n1,n2 , and negative  ∆s,n1  and negative ∆n1,n2. However, since ∆ is
positive, there are really only two ∆s,n2 values: ∆s,n1 + ∆n1,n2  and the absolute value of ∆s,n1
- ∆n1,n2.  The frequency of each of these values is recorded for each pair of ∆ values drawn
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from the original data. The result is an approximation of  ∆s,n2 for each pair of
sourcen1n2 trust values (10-10, 10-9, 10-8, 10-7, 10-6, 9-8, 9-7, 9-6, 8-7, 8-6, 7-7,
and 7-6). Notice that the operations performed – addition and absolute difference – are
commutative, so the ordering of pairs in this analysis does not matter; the average ∆ for i-
j is the same as if it were j-i.
 Figure 6.12 shows this same process carried out to a path with four steps:
sourcen1n2n3sink. In this case, there are four possible values for each ∆source,n3:
two for each of the two ∆s,n2 values.
Figure 6.12: An illustration of how ∆s,n2 values are derived for a path length of four.
Although the results obtained by composing these values are only an
approximation, they give a general sense of the impact path length has on accuracy. The
numbers in section 6.2.1 indicate the measured ∆ in paths of length 2 (sourcen1sink).
Table 6.5 shows the data for paths of length 2, 3, and 4.
The Path Length 2 data is the original data from section 6.2.1. For the path length
3 data, we can look at either the rows or columns to get a sense of the changes. As either
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one of the trust values in the pair decreases, the average ∆ increases. For example,
consider the first row. The average ∆ rises steadily from a low of at 10-10 to its highest
value in that row at 10-6. Similarly, choose the column headed by 6. The average ∆ there
is lowest at 6-10 and highest at 6-6. In fact, the lowest average ∆ is 1.52 at the pair 10-10,
and the highest is 2.497 at the pair 6-6. Not surprisingly, this shows that the correlation
between trust value and average ∆  is preserved in the longer path.
Table 6.5: Average ∆ values for paths from source to sink of length 2, 3, and 4.
Source -> n1    
  10 9 8 7 6    
2 0.953 1.054 1.251 1.5 1.702  
10 9 8 7 6  
1.520 1.588 1.698 1.958 2.076 10
  1.652 1.756 2.017 2.129 9
    1.837 2.098 2.188 8
      2.329 2.424 7Le
ng
th
 3
        2.497 6
n1
->
n2
10 9 8 7 6  
1.92 1.969 2.048 2.287 2.369 10->10
  2.017 2.092 2.327 2,406 10->9
    2.16 2.396 2.464 10->8
      2.599 2.666 10->7
        2.725 10->6
  2.063 2.136 2.367 2.443 9->9
    2.202 2.341 2.499 9->8
      2.632 2.698 9->7
        2.755 9->6
    2.263 2.489 2.553 8->8
      2.687 2.746 8->7
        2.801 8->6
      2.862 2.919 7->7
        2.968 7->6
Le
ng
th
 4
        3.015 6->6
n1
->
n2
->
n3
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Also of interest is that the lowest average ∆ is still higher than the average ∆ in
path length 2. This is true for each value. With a path length of 2, the average ∆ for trust
rating 9 is 1.054. With a path length of 3, the lowest average ∆ for a pair containing a 9 is
the 910 value of 1.58.
Table 6.6 presents the data for paths of length  5. Since the same set of data points
were being used, it is not surprising that these follow the same patterns as were seen in
Table 6.6. For any row or column, there is a clear increase in ∆ as a trust value decreases.
At each step of the path, new error is introduced. If n1 differs slightly from the source,
and n2 differs slightly from n1, then n2 can move closer to the source's value, or it can
move further away. At each step, the range of possible error expands; this is visible in
figure 6.12, as the space between the line representing the source's rating and the line for
the most distant ∆ increases at each node.
Table 6.6: Average ∆ values for paths from source to sink of length 5.
sourcen1n2
10-10 10-9 10-8 10-7 10-6 9-9 9-8 9-7 9-6 8-8 8-7 8-6 7-7 7-6 6-6
2.44 2.51 2.52 2.79 2.92 2.58 2.59 2.86 2.98 2.6 2.86 2.07 3.11 3.21 3.31 10-10
          2.65 2.66 2.92 3.03 2.66 2.93 3.03 3.16 3.27 3.36 10-9
                  2.66 2.92 3.03 3.17 3.26 3.35 10-8
                        3.39 3.48 3.57 10-7
                            3.65 10-6
          2.71 2.72 2.98 3.09 2.73 2.98 3.09 3.22 3.32 3.42 9-9
                  2.73 2.98 3.09 3.22 3.32 3.41 9-8
                        3.45 3.54 3.62 9-7
                            3.7 9-6
                  2.73 2.98 3.08 3.23 3.31 3.4 8-8
                        3.44 3.53 3.61 8-7
                            3.69 8-6
                        3.65 3.73 3.81 7-7
                            3.89 7-6
                            3.96 6-6
n2
->
n3
->
n4
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For each path length, Table 6.7 shows the minimum average ∆ for any path
containing a given trust value. For example, for paths of length 5 (shown in Table 6.6),
the minimum average ∆ for a path containing a trust rating of 9 is 2.51 in the 10-9-10-10
path; all other paths containing a 9 have a higher average ∆. In fact, in every case, the
path with the lowest average ∆ was made up of all 10's with one instance of the lower
trust value.
Table 6.7: Minimum average ∆ for paths of various lengths containing the specified trust
rating.
Path Length
  2 3 4 5
10 0.953 1.52 1.92 2.44
9 1.054 1.588 1.969 2.51
8 1.251 1.698 2.048 2.52
7 1.5 1.958 2.287 2.79T
ru
st 
Ra
tin
g
6 1.702 2.076 2.369 2.92
Figure 6.13 illustrates the relationships from Table 6.7.
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Figure 6.13: Minimum average ∆  from all paths of a fixed length containing a given trust
value.
In Figure 6.13, the effect of path length can be compared to the effects of trust
ratings. The points for the path length of 2 are the direct comparisons made in section
6.2.1. The average ∆ for trust values of 7 on paths of length 2 is approximately the same
as the average ∆ for trust values of 10 on paths of length 3 (both are close to 1.5). The
average ∆ for trust values of 7 on paths of length 3 is about the same as the average ∆ for
trust values of 9 on paths of length 4. A precise rule cannot be derived from these values
because there is not a perfect linear relationship, and also because the points in Figure
6.13 are only the minimum average ∆ among paths with the given trust rating.
This relationship will be integrated into the algorithms for inferring trust
presented in the next section.
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6.3   TidalTrust: An Algorithm for Inferring Trust
The in-depth look at the effects of trust ratings and path length in the previous section
guided the development of TidalTrust, an algorithm for inferring trust in networks with
continuous rating systems. The following guidelines can be extracted from the analysis of
section 6.2:
1. For a fixed trust rating, shorter paths have a lower average ∆.
2. For a fixed path length, higher trust ratings have a lower average ∆.
The following sections describe how these features are incorporated into the final
TidalTrust algorithm
6.3.1   Incorporating Path Length
The analysis in section 6.2 indicates that a limit on the depth of the search should
lead to more accurate results, since the average ∆ increases as depth increases. To test the
effect of limiting path length, the resulting inferred value must be compared to a known
value. The same problem occurs here as was described in section 6.2.3; the inferred value
must be compared to a neighbor of the source, and the connectance features of the
network limit the number of long paths that exist. In fact, performing this analysis
showed no statistically significant difference between the accuracy of the inferred values
generated when the path length is limited to 2 and the inferred values generated with an
unlimited path length.
Although the properties of the network prevented a pure comparison-based
analysis of long paths, there are other properties that guide the use of path length in the
algorithm. If accuracy decreases as path length increases, as the earlier analysis suggests,
then shorter paths are more desirable. However, the tradeoff is that fewer nodes will be
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reachable if a limit is imposed on the path depth. To balance these factors, the path length
can vary from one computation to another. Instead of a fixed depth, the shortest path
length required to connect the source to the sink becomes the depth. This preserves the
benefits of a shorter path length without limiting the number of inferences that can be
made.
6.3.2   Incorporating Continuous Trust
The algorithms presented in Chapter 5 had high accuracy because of the rounding
that was possible, taking advantage of the properties of binomial distributions. When
ratings are continuous instead of binary, the algorithms must be adjusted to take
advantage of other properties that will increase their accuracy. This section presents three
alternative designs for averaging information from neighbors, and analyzes them to
decide which to use in the TidalTrust algorithm
The correlation between trust rating of the neighbor and accuracy of that
neighbor's rating is clear (see section 6.2.1). In the binary network-based algorithms,
when the source wants to infer a rating to  the sink, it begins by asking all of its trusted
neighbors for their opinion of the sink. It takes the responses from each node and
averages them. To translate this to a system with continuous trust values, the simple
average is changed to a weighted average where more weight will be given to nodes with
higher trust values.
Let tij represent the trust rating from node i to node j. The inferred trust rating
from node i to node s is given by formula 1.
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€ 
tis =
tij t js
j∈adj( i)
∑
tij
j∈adj( i)
∑
(1)
This formula respects the fact that more trusted neighbors are generally more
accurate. Formula (1) uses trust ratings as the weights. This is the simplest weighted
average, but it may not be the most accurate. Before settling on a final algorithm, there
are several issues that need to be addressed regarding how trust values should be
incorporated.
The results from section 6.2 indicate that the most accurate information will com
from the highest trusted neighbors. As such, we may want the algorithm to limit the
information it receives so that it comes from only the most trusted neighbors, essentially
giving no weight to the information from neighbors with low trust. If the algorithm were
to take information only from neighbors with the highest trusted neighbor, each node
would look at its neighbors, select those with the highest trust rating, and average their
results. However, since different nodes will have different maximum values, some may
restrict themselves to returning information only from neighbors rated 10, while others
may have a maximum assigned value of 6 and be returning information from neighbors
with that lower rating. Since this mixes in various levels of trust, it is not an ideal
approach. On the other end of possibilities, the source may find the maximum value it has
assigned, and limit every node to returning information only from nodes with that rating
or higher. However, if the source has assigned a high maximum rating, it is often the case
that there is no path with that high rating to the sink. The inferences that are made may be
quite accurate, but the number of cases where no inference is made will increase. To
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address this problem, we define a variable max that represents the largest trust value that
can be used as a minimum threshold for every node such that a path can be found from
source to sink. The method for calculating max will be described in section 6.3.3. The
revised formula is given in formula 2.
€ 
tis =
tij t js
j∈adj( i)∍ tij >=max
∑
tij
j∈adj( i)∍ tij >=max
∑ (2)
On the other end of the extreme is the case were only the simple average of the
neighbors is taken, and there is no consideration given to the trustworthiness of each
neighbor. Although this goes against the previous data suggesting that trust will impact
the accuracy of the inferences, it is worth considering this alternative. It is given in
formula 3.
€ 
tis =
t js
j∈adj( i)
∑
adj(i)
(3)
Algorithms using these three formulas were tested on both the Trust Project
network with approximately 2,000 users, and on the smaller FilmTrust network with
about 400 users.  In each network, each node was chosen as the source. Each direct
neighbor of the source was chosen as a sink, and the trust value was calculated from
source to sink. The calculated value was  compared to the source's known rating of that
neighbor to come up with a ∆ value. The average ∆s are shown in Table 6.8. The first
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row shows the average for all ∆s that were calculated. However, because of the high
connectance and correspondingly high number of short paths, it was not uncommon for
the ∆ value for a given source-sink pair to be the same for each algorithm; this was the
case about 62% of the time in the FilmTrust network, and 53% of the time in the Trust
Project network. To highlight the differences among the algorithms, we selected only the
cases where the three values were not identical. These are the values shown in the second
row.
When looking at all data points (shown in the first row), it appears that the
maximum trust average has a lower average ∆ for both the FilmTrust and Trust Project
network; however, this difference was not statistically significant. When the distinct
points were separated out (as shown in the second row), the maximum trust average has a
lower average ∆ and the difference is significant with p<0.01.
We know that the Maximum Trust Average is superior. However, it would be
reasonable to expect that between the other two algorithms, the Weighted Average would
outperform the Simple average, since the former gives more weight to nodes that should
be more accurate. In this analysis, the difference between the weighted average and
simple average was not significant for the full set of points or for the distinct points. This
may be because the networks are not large enough to show a difference, or it could be
that the effect of the weighting is not strong enough to have an impact on accuracy.
Because the results from the maximum trust average are significantly better where
there is a difference in the ∆ values among the algorithms, this is the averaging
mechanism that will be used in TidalTrust.
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Table 6.8: Average ∆ for the methods of inferring trust. The Distinct Points represent the
data taken only when the values returned by the three methods were not all identical. This
highlights specifically when one method is more effective than the others.
FilmTrust Trust Project
Weighted
Average
Maximum
Trust
Average
Simple
Average
Weighted
Average
Maximum
Trust
Average
Simple
Average
All Points 2.136 2.062 2.242 1.400 1.250 1.429
Distinct Points1.857 1.710 2.027 1.264 0.972 1.317
6.3.3  Full Algorithm for Inferring Trust
Incorporating the elements presented in the previous sections, the final TidalTrust
algorithm can be assembled. The name was chosen because calculations sweep forward
from source to sink in the network, and then pull back from the sink to return the final
value to the source.
The source node begins a search for the sink. It will poll each of its neighbors to
obtain their rating of the sink. Each neighbor repeats this process, keeping track of the
current depth from the source. Each node will also keep track of the strength of the path
to it. Nodes adjacent to the source will record the source's rating assigned to them. Each
of those nodes will poll their neighbors. The strength of the path to each neighbor is the
minimum of the source's rating of the node and the node's rating of its neighbor. The
neighbor records the maximum strength path leading to it.  Once a path is found from the
source to the sink, the depth is set at the maximum depth allowable. Since the search is
proceeding in a Breadth First Search fashion, the first path found will be at the minimum
depth. The search will continue to find any other paths at the minimum depth. Once this
search is complete, the trust threshold (the variable max in formula 2) is established by
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taking the maximum of the trust paths leading to the sink. This is illustrated in Figure
6.14.
Figure 6.14: The process of determining the trust threshold. The label on each edge
represents the trust rating between nodes. The label on each node indicates the maximum
trust strength on the path leading to that node. The two nodes adjacent to the sink have
values of 9, so 9 is the max value. The bold edges indicate which paths will ultimately be
used in the calculation because they are at or above the max threshold.
With the max value established, each node can complete the calculations of a
weighted average by taking information from nodes that they have rated at or above the
max threshold. The pseudo code for TidalTrust, given a graph G, source node, and sink
node, is given below:
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1  for each n in G
2   color(n) = white
3   q = empty
4  TidalTrust (source, sink)
5   push (q, source)
6   depth=1
7   maxdepth = infinity
8   while q not empty and depth ≤ maxdepth
9      n = pop(q)
10     push (d(depth), n)
11     if sink in adj(source)
12        cached_rating(n,sink) = rating(n,sink)
13        maxdepth = depth
14        flow = min(path_flow(n), rating(n,sink))
15        path_flow(sink) = max (path_flow(sink), flow)
16        push (children(n), sink)
17     else
18        for each n2 in adj(n)
19          if color(n2) = gray
20             color(n2) = gray
21             push (temp_q, n2)
22          if n2 in temp_q
23             flow = min(path_flow(n), rating(n,n2))
24             path_flow(n2) = max (path_flow(n2), flow)
25             push (children(n), n2)
26     if q empty
27        q = temp_q
28        depth = depth +1
29        temp_q = empty
30  max = path_flow(sink)
31  depth = depth-1
32  while depth>0
33     while d(depth) not empty
34        n = pop(d(depth))
35        for each n2 in children(n)
36           if (rating(n,n2)>=max) and cached_rating(n2,sink)≥0
37             numerator =
               numerator + rating(n,n2)* cached_rating(n2,sink)
38             denominator = denominator +rating(n,n2)
39        if denominator > 0
40          cached_rating(n,sink) = numerator / denominator
41        else
42           cached_rating(n,sink) = -1
43     depth = depth-1
44  return cached_rating(source, sink)
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The variable q is a queue of nodes at the current depth. Beginning at depth 1,
there is only one node in the queue q – the source. We also begin with maxdepth equal to
infinity because it is unknown at what depth the shortest path to the sink will be found.
Line 8 begins a loop through the nodes at a given depth. For each node n, we begin by
recording the depth at which it was visited. The variable d(depth) is a queue, recording all
the nodes at a given depth. This will be used later in the algorithm. Then, we check to see
if the selected node is adjacent to the sink. If the sink is in the adjacency list of the
selected node, several parameters are set. First, the rating from n to the sink is cached.
Then, the maxdepth variable is set. Since a breadth first search is being conducted, all the
nodes at the current depth will be searched before proceeding to the next level. The
maxdepth variable is used to stop the searches once the shortest path length has been
discovered. Lines 14 and 15 are used to help find only the highest rated paths. A network
flow-type model is used for finding the highest trust path. The lowest trust rating along a
series of links in a path limits the overall flow of trust through that path. Line 14 takes the
minimum of the flow currently seen from the source to the node, and then from the node
to the sink. This records the minimum trust value along the path from source to sink. Line
15 then determines the maximum flow path to the sink. It will either come from a
previously found path or from the current path. We assume that both the min and max
functions handle undefined values for path_flow, and, if an undefined value is seen, the
defined alternative will always be returned. Finally, the sink is added to n's list of
children. The children are a subset of all nodes adjacent to n. In general, the list of
children will include either the sink, or all nodes except for those that have been
discovered earlier in the search.
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If the current node n does not have a link to the sink, then we proceed to the else
portion of the branch on line 17. Within that branch, each node that has not been seen
before (determined by checking the color) is colored grey and added to the temp_q. Then,
any neighbor that has been first discovered at the current depth (determined by checking
to see if it is in the temp_q) is added to the list of children and the flow calculations
described above are repeated.  Note that these steps differ from the standard breadth-first
search. By checking for nodes in the temp_q instead of checking only for previously
undiscovered nodes, the condition allows a node to include a neighbor in its list of
children, even if that neighbor has been previously added to the temp_q by another node
on the same level. Figure 6.15 illustrates this. If that section of code were missing, node
B would not be able to include node C in its list of children because node C already
would have been colored grey and added to the queue by node A.
Figure 6.15: A network illustrating when the condition at line 22 will allow for more
children. If node A is considered first, it will add node C to the temp_q (list of nodes to
be searched at the next depth) and color it gray.  TidalTrust will allow node B to also
include node C in its list of children, even though it was previously discovered by node
A.
106
After every node at the current depth has been checked, the queue q is set equal to
the temp_q. This replaces the empty q with the set of nodes at the next depth. The depth
variable is also incremented at this point. When the while loop at line 8 repeats, the queue
q will not be empty. If no path was found to the sink at the previous depth, then the
maxdepth will still be equal to infinity and the loop will continue.
Once the sink has been found or all nodes that can be reached from the source
have been searched, the loop ends. At that point, the max variable, which stores the
maximum trust flow along a path from the source to sink can be set. The depth is also
decremented to lead into the while loop at line 32. This loop backtracks from the deepest
nodes back to the source at depth 1. The loop at line 33 goes through all of the nodes seen
at the current depth. For each node in the children list, the child's rating is weighted and
added to a running sum only if the rating from the node to the child is at or above the max
threshold, and if the child has a cached rating for the sink. After each child has been seen,
the weighted average is cached. After all nodes at a given depth have been looked at, the
depth is decremented and the steps are repeated for the next level.
Once the loop has completed, the rating from the source to the sink will be
cached, and that value is returned.
The complexity of this algorithm is O(V+E). Within the loop at line 8, each node
is colored gray when it is enqueued. Since only white nodes are enqueued and no node is
ever whitened after it is grayed, each node will only be visited once. Enqueueing and
dequeueing take O(1) time, the time for visiting the nodes is O(V). The adjacency list for
each node is looked at only when the node is dequeued. It is used at line 11, when we
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check if the sink is contained in that list, and in the loop at line 18. In the worst case,
searching for the sink at line 11 will require visiting each item in the adjacency list one
time, and the loop at line 18 will definitely require searching the entire adjacency list.
The sum of the length of all the adjacency lists is θ(E), and to search each line twice will
still require θ(E) time since the constant is incorporated. Thus, at most O(E) time is spent
scanning the adjacency lists, and making the calculations for path length (which runs in
O(1) time).
Together, the loops at line 32 and 33 will visit each node in the network, for a
total of O(V) steps. Each node is only visited once. Again, for each node, a subset of its
adjacency list is visited only one time, in the loop at line 35. Each of the steps within
these loops can be accomplished in O(1) time, so the second portion of the algorithm also
has the complexity O(E).
The initialization step at lines 1-2 take O(V) time. Thus, the total time for the
algorithm is O(V) + O(E) + O(E) = O(V+E) time. Thus, TidalTrust runs in time linear to
the size of the adjacency list representation of the network. For the networks in this
research, where E >> V, the algorithm is basically running in O(E) time.
6.4   Accuracy of TidalTrust
6.4.1   Discussion of Trust and Accuracy
The accuracy of any trust algorithm will vary from network to network, simply as
an effect of the number of users and their behavior within the social network.  There are
properties of trust within a social network that should be considered when making
statements about accuracy.
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Trust is expressed in web-based social networks as an explicit number assigned
by the user to each friend. In calculating trust, the algorithm takes this personal
perspective into account. When analyzing the results, the differences between people is
also important. For example, consider the case where a user has rated a number of friends
and given every one of them ratings of 9 or 10 on a 1-10 scale. What does this mean?
There are several possibilities.
1. The user has a high propensity to trust (or is naive) and is likely to give high ratings
to anyone. If this is the case, less trustworthy people may receive higher ratings
because of this user.
2. The user feels bad about assigning low ratings, and gives high ones (even though the
information is kept private).
3. The user only bothers to rate people that are very trustworthy, and does not spend
time on anyone else. In this case, the user may be providing very accurate information
about the people who have been rated.
4. The user does not understand the scale, and may be mis-assigning ratings. For
example, if the user incorrectly treats the middle of the scale – a rating of 5 – as
neutral and lower ratings as expressions of distrust, then the ratings from that user
will all be skewed.
We cannot know which of these scenarios is responsible for the user's behavior,
or if there is some other factor at work. For example, it is known that there is volatility in
user ratings based; a user who has rated a string of untrustworthy people may be inclined
to give a lower rating to the next person they rate than if the preceding people had been
highly trustworthy (Cosely, et al., 2003). As a result of this potential inconsistency and
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volatility, there is no clear action to be taken. The values cannot be normalized. It is clear
that normalizing a rating of 9 down to a 1 would rarely capture the user's intention. Even
normalizing to a value between 1 and 9 could be incorrect if the user understands and
intends to give the ratings they gave. Even if we know the user has made some poor
assumptions to motivate the way ratings were assigned, there is little evidence that
suggests how to deal with such a situation. As a result, there is no choice but to assume
the user meant the ratings that were given, and to proceed with calculations.
This highlights the fact that trust is imprecise, particularly as it is expressed in
web-based social networks. Variation between users, within a single user's rating
depending on their state of mind at the time they gave the ratings, and in intended
meaning all affect the possible accuracy. With this in mind, it is unreasonable to expect
that a trust inference could be made to within, say ±0.1. Even the meaning of such small
differences is unclear.
Additionally, it is important to note that trust is not simply another word for
correlation. Although I have shown that there is a correlation between trust rating and
user similarity by comparing ratings of common neighbors, trust captures other concepts
as well. Chapter 7 will show that trust is particularly useful for users when their opinions
differ from the average user's opinion. This suggests that it may also be the case that
users are more likely to assign high trust ratings to friends who agree with them when the
users' opinions are quite different from the average, even if there is some variation when
their opinion is close to the average, than to assign high trust ratings to friends who have
strong correlations in the average case but who disagree when the users' opinions are
divergent.
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6.4.3   Alterations to TidalTrust
As presented above, TidalTrust strictly adheres to the observed characteristics of
trust: shorter paths and higher trust values lead to better accuracy. However, there are
some things that should be kept in mind. The most important is that networks are
different. Depending on the subject (or lack thereof) about which trust is being expressed,
the user community, and the design of the network, the effect of these properties of trust
can vary. While we should still expect the general principles to be the same – shorter
paths will be better than longer ones, and higher trusted people will agree with us more
than less trusted people – the proportions of those relationships may differ from what was
observed in the sample networks used in this research.
For example, in some networks an increase in the depth of a search may only
slightly decrease the accuracy of an inference. Similarly, the distribution of trust in some
networks may state that there are only small differences among people rated above a
certain threshold, but an increase in depth could lead to a dramatic drop in accuracy. Still
another situation could be that in a given network, it is better to search one level deeper
allowing people slightly below the max  trust threshold to be included, because
information from more people – even if they are potentially a bit less trusted – can lead to
more accurate results overall.
These are all factors that will vary from one network to another. TidalTrust is not
designed to be the optimal trust inference algorithm for every network in the state it is
presented above. Rather, the algorithm presented here adheres to the observed rules of
trust. When implementing this algorithm on a network, modifications should be made to
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the conditions of the algorithm that adjust the maximum depth of the search, or the trust
threshold at which nodes are no longer considered. How and when to make those
adjustments will depend on the specific features of a given network. These tweaks will
not affect the computational complexity – or even the complexity of implementation.
TidalTrust is designed to be a base algorithm that can accept slight modifications
to optimize results for any given network. Indeed, because trust is such a loose concept,
that is implemented and thought of differently across communities and contexts, it is
naive  to suggest that any single strict set of rules would apply equally across the board.
When implementing this algorithm in a network, designers should take the time to study
and understand the characteristics of their network and fine-tune the implementation
accordingly.
6.4.3   Related Algorithms and Comparison
There are other methods for computing trust that have been presented in the
literature (see chapter 4). Even considering the arguments in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, a
comparison of TidalTrust to other algorithms is useful. In this section, I describe which
algorithms produce output that is suitable for direct comparison, and show that TidalTrust
outperforms the algorithms most suitable for comparison.
Three of the major algorithms that first seemed to be candidates for comparison –
Eigentrust (Kamvar, et al., 1998), Appleseed (Zeigler, Lausen, 2004a), and Richardson's
algorithm (2003) – all had a common characteristic that prevented a comparison. Each
relies on computing the principal eigenvector to make trust computations. The result from
all three algorithms is a vector of trust values, corresponding to how much trust the
source should have for each node in the network. The values in the vector are not
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recommended trust values on a given, scale, however. They are ranks  of the
trustworthiness of individuals. There is no way that these rank values can be converted to
approximate trust values on a scale, like the 1 – 10 scale used in this work. Any
conversion attempt ends with a small number of nodes with reasonable values, and most
nodes with very small values.
The goal of those algorithms is to apply the results in a system where the ranks
are appropriate. TidalTrust, on the contrary, is designed to recommend explicitly how
much the user should trust any individually selected node.
Advogato (Levin, 1998) presents a similar problem for comparison. While the
Advogato algorithm does not produce a rank of nodes, it is based on a network flow
model that similarly alters the output. Each node is assigned a capacity and the Ford-
Fulkerson max-flow algorithm is used to compute trust. With a given capacity, trust
values will need to be normalized to within that capacity. That is, if two nodes have the
same capacity where one node has rated a large number of people and another node has
rated only a few people, the ratings of the first node will be diminished more than the
ratings of the second node to fit within the capacity limit. As discussed in section 6.4.1,
this adjustment can incorrectly change the intention of the user. For example, a user who
only rates friends who are very trustworthy may have twenty friends with a rating of 10.
With a capacity limit, those ratings would be normalized to much lower values than if the
user had only two friends, each with a rating of 10. Because the normalized trust values
are removed from the scale at which the user assigned trust, this algorithm will not output
recommended trust values within the same scale as trust is assigned. Thus, since the
output is different, it does not make for a valid comparison.
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Other work  has suggested some trust mechanisms but these are far simpler than
the goal set forth here. For example (Massa, Avesani, 2004) combines trust values with
similarity measures in recommender systems. Their trust measure, however, is basically a
measure of depth. That is, some maximum depth d is set, and the actual shortest distance
from the source to the node in question is measured as n. The recommended trust value is
then just calculated as (d – n +1) / d. This is also designed to be used in systems with
only binary trust ratings. Thus, every user at depth 1 will be trusted fully. Every user 2
steps away will have the same recommended trust value, and so on for n steps. Thus,
there is no reasonable comparison between their algorithm and TidalTrust, which
computes an actual value.
On the other hand, the Public Key Infrastructure trust algorithms are much better
candidates for comparison. Beth-Borcherding-Klein (1994) is designed to make
calculations in the same way as TidalTrust – given two nodes in a trust network, compute
how much one node should trust the other, with output in the same scale that ratings are
assigned. Although later work has extended and modified Beth-Borcherding-Klein (such
as Reiter, Stubblebine, 1999), the original algorithm is still intuitive, and the extensions,
designed to prevent attacks or malicious users, are not yet necessary in the small and
observably honest networks available for testing.
In addition to Beth-Borcherding-Klein, the simple average of ratings assigned to
the sink is also a valid comparison to make. While it is not a complex algorithm, the
simple average is one of the most common ways of composing ratings (trust or
otherwise).
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To determine accuracy, a ∆ value was calculated that measured the difference
between a node's actual, direct rating of a neighbor and the inferred trust rating for that
neighbor. These algorithms were run on the Trust Project network and the FilmTrust
network.
Table 6.9: Average ∆ for TidalTrust, Beth-Borcherding-Klein (BBK), and simple
average.
  Algorithm
Network TidalTrust BBK Simple
Average
Trust Project 1.09 1.59 1.43
FilmTrust 1.35 2.75 1.93
As shown in Table 6.9, TidalTrust outperforms both Beth-Borcherding-Klein and
the simple average. In both networks, this difference is statistically significant. It is
somewhat surprising to see the simple average outperforming the Beth-Borcherding-
Klein algorithm. This difference was not statistically significant in the Trust Project
network, but was in the FilmTrust network. Because the FilmTrust network is small, and
all of the algorithms tend to be less accurate (possibly due to the way members are
assigning trust), it may be an artifact of the network that leads to this result, rather than a
weakness in the BBK algorithm. Analyzing these types of situations, as well as
experimenting on larger networks, is a problem discussed as future work (Chapter 10).
6.5   Conclusions
This chapter introduced the TidalTrust algorithm for inferring trust relationships
in trust networks with ratings on a continuous scale. Beginning with an analysis in two
naturally-developed networks, I showed the correlation between accuracy, trust rating,
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and path length. The information gleaned from this analysis was used in evolving an
algorithm from the binary network-based algorithm of chapter 5.
TidalTrust is designed to search to the minimum depth at which a path is found
from source to sink, and to take only the most trusted paths available at that depth. This
comes directly from the analysis in section 6.2. The TidalTrust algorithm was then
compared against two other methods for finding and composing trust values. Experiments
showed that selecting only the maximum trust paths significantly outperformed both a
simple average and a weighted average with no minimum depth. A complexity analysis
shows that the algorithm runs in time linear with the size of the network.
Finally, the accuracy of TidalTrust is judged. It is important to consider that
accuracy as measured here may not capture all the intricacies of trust, and furthermore,
the social nature of trust and the personal variations in the way trust is assigned prevent
algorithms from being exceptionally accurate. With that in mind, TidalTrust was
compared to the Beth-Borcherding-Klein algorithm and a simple average. On the two
networks available for testing, TidalTrust significantly outperformed both.
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Chapter 7
Trust Inferences in Application: FilmTrust
With evidence that these simple algorithms are effective at making accurate trust
recommendations, the next step is to use the inferred trust values in applications.
FilmTrust is a website that combines trust networks with movie information. Users can
rate films and write reviews on the website. The website then combines the user's trust
data and the movie ratings created by trusted friends (and friends-of-friends) to display a
custom rating for each movie to the user. Similarly, trust values are used to order the
reviews shown for a particular movie. Essentially, the social network becomes the
foundation for a recommender system.
In this chapter, a description of the FilmTrust website is followed by an analysis
of its features. The accuracy of the recommended ratings is shown to outperform both a
simple average and a common recommender system algorithm. Theoretically and through
a small user study, some evidence is also established that supports a user benefit from
ordering reviews based on the users' trust preferences.
117
The results here suggest that trust can be used to enhance the user experience.
However, because the network available here is small – only about 400 users, with only
about 280 users actually connected to the social network – the results are preliminary. To
verify them, experiments must be conducted in a larger network, with thousands of users.
This is a primary space of future work.
7.1  Related Work
Recommender systems help users identify items of interest. These
recommendations are generally made in two ways: by calculating the similarity between
items and recommending items related to those in which the user has expressed interest,
or by calculating the similarity between users in the system and recommending items that
are liked by similar users. This latter method is also known as collaborative filtering.
Collaborative filtering has been applied in many contexts, and FilmTrust is not
the first to attempt to make predictive recommendations about movies. MovieLens
(Herlocker, et al., 1999; Herlocker et al., 2000), Recommendz (Garden, Dudeck, 2005),
and Film-Conseil (Perny, Zucker, 2001) are just a few of the websites that implement
recommender systems in the context of films. In section 3, some of their algorithms are
applied on the FilmTrust network and the results are compared.
Herlocker, et al. (2004) present an excellent overview of the goals, datasets, and
algorithms of collaborative filtering systems. Their paper presents several categories of
goals and tasks for which collaborative filtering is used. The category into which
FilmTrust falls is also the category that comprises the majority of work in this space:
Find Good Items. However, FilmTrust is unlike the approach taken in many collaborative
filtering recommender systems in that its goal is not to present a list of good items to
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users; rather, the recommendations are generated to suggest how much a given user may
be interested in an item that the user already found. For this to work, there must be a
measure of how closely the item is related to the user's preferences.
In this work, the aim is to use trust ratings within the social network as the basis
for making calculations about similarity. To determine whether or not a user will like an
item, the opinions about the item expressed by other trusted users are composed into a
recommendation. For this technique to be successful, there must be a correlation between
trust and user similarity. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes(2000) showed that in a predefined
context, such as movies, users develop social connections with people who have similar
preferences. These results were extended in work by Ziegler and Lausen (2004b). Their
work showed a correlation between trust and user similarity in an empirical study of a
real online community.
Other work has touched on trust in recommender systems, including (Massa,
Avesani, 2004) and (Massa, Bhattacharjee, 2004). These works address the use of trust
within systems where the set of commonly rated items between users is sparse. That
situation leads to a breakdown in correlation-based recommender system algorithms, and
their work explores how incorporating even simple binary trust relationships can increase
the coverage and thus the number of recommendations that can be made.
Ziegler and Lausen(2004a) also introduce a mechanism for using trust to calculate
recommendations. They compute a trust ranking, based on spreading activation models.
That ranking is then used in place of user similarity measures (such as the Pearson
correlation) to calculate recommendations for the user.
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Accuracy is one measure of the success of an algorithm in making a
recommendation. User preference is another. Recent work provides two indications that
users will prefer the sort of system that relies on trust in social networks. First, users tend
to prefer recommendations from people they know and trust (Sinha, Swearingen, 2001).
Related work also showed that users prefer recommendations from systems that they trust
and understand (Swearingen, Sinha, 2001). Because social trust is a common part of our
everyday lives, this makes the underpinning of the system accessible to users. Other
systems have tried to take advantage of these facts by adding in explanations to
recommendations. Herlocker, et al., (2000), presented users with information the
different ratings assigned to a specific movie, and how many of their friends had made
each rating. Their work showed that presenting these explanations to users helped them
accept the recommendations from the system because they had more trust in how the
recommendations were generated.
7.2  The FilmTrust Website
The website for FilmTrust is designed to hide the technical details from users and
present a simple, easy-to-use interface.
The social networking component of the website requires users to provide a trust
rating for each person they add as a friend. The definition of trust on the website uses the
general definition presented earlier cast in the context of movies, that requires a
commitment based on the belief about a person's actions. When creating a trust rating on
the site, users are advised to rate how much they trust their friend about movies. In the
help section, when they ask for more help, they are advised to, "Think of this as if the
person were to have rented a movie to watch, how likely it is that you would want to see
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that film." Watching the film would be the commitment based on the belief that the
person will rent a movie of interest.
Part of the user's profile is a "Friends" page, shown in Figure 7.1. In the FilmTrust
network, relationships can be one-way, so the page displays a list of people the user has
named as friends, and a second list of people who have named the user as a friend. An
icon indicates reciprocal relationships and the trust ratings that the user assigned are
shown next to each friend.
If trust ratings are visible to everyone, users can be discouraged from giving
accurate ratings for fear of offending or upsetting people by giving them low ratings.
Because honest trust ratings are important to the function of the system, these values are
kept private and shown only to the user who assigned them. The ratings that people
assigned to the user are not shown.
The other features of the website are movie ratings and reviews. Users can choose
any film and rate it on a scale of a half star to four stars. They can also write free-text
reviews about movies. The "movies" page of a user displays data for every movie that the
user has rated or reviewed. This page is shown in Figure 7.2.
121
Figure 7.1: A users' friend listing at the FilmTrust website.
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Figure 7.2: A user's movies page with titles, ratings, reviews, and options.
Social networks meet movie information on the "Ratings and Reviews" page
shown in Figure 7.3. Users are shown two ratings for each movie. The first is the simple
average of all ratings given to the film. The "Recommended Rating" uses the inferred
trust values for the users who rated the film as weights to calculate a weighted average
rating. Because the inferred trust values reflect how much the user should trust the
opinions of the person rating the movie, the weighted average of movie ratings should
reflect the user's opinion. If the user has an opinion that is different from the average, the
rating calculated from trusted friends – who should have similar opinions – should reflect
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that difference. Similarly, if a movie has multiple reviews, they are sorted according to
the inferred trust rating of the author. This presents the reviews authored by the most
trusted people first to assist the user in finding information that will be most relevant.
Figure 7.3: The move ratings and reviews page for Jaws. Notice that the average user
rating and recommended rating differ. The recommended rating most strongly reflects the
ratings of trusted friends.
7.3  Site Personalization
7.3.1   Recommended Movie Ratings
One of the features of the FilmTrust site that uses the social network is the
"Recommended Rating" feature. As figure 7.3 shows, users will see this in addition to the
average rating given to a particular movie.
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The "Recommended Rating" is personalized using the trust values for the people
who have rated the film (the raters). The process for calculating this rating is very similar
to the process for calculating trust ratings presented in chapter 6. First, the system
searches for raters that the source knows directly. If there are no direct connections from
the user to any raters, the system moves one step out to find connections from the user to
raters of path length 2. This process repeats until a path is found. The opinion of all raters
at that depth are considered. Then, using the algorithm from chapter 6, the trust value is
calculated for each rater at the given depth. Once every rater has been given an inferred
trust value, only the ones with the highest ratings will be selected; this is done by simply
finding the maximum trust value calculated for each of the raters at the selected depth,
and choosing all of the raters for which that maximum value was calculated. Finally, once
the raters have been selected, their ratings for the movie (in number of stars) are
averaged. For the set of selected nodes S, the recommended rating r from node s to movie
m is the average of the movie ratings from nodes in S weighted by the trust value t from s
to each node:
€ 
rsm =
tsirim
i∈S
∑
tsi
i∈S
∑
This average is rounded to the nearest half-star, and that value becomes the
"Recommended Rating" that is personalized for each user.
As a simple example, consider the following:
• Alice trusts Bob 9
• Alice trusts Chuck 3
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• Bob rates the movie "Jaws" with 4 stars
• Chuck rates the movie "Jaws" with 2 stars
Then Alice's recommended rating for "Jaws" is calculated as follows:
€ 
tAlice−>Bob * rBob−>Jaws + tAlice−>ChuckrChuck−Jaws
tAlice−>Bob + tAlice−>Chuck
=
9* 4 + 3*2
9 + 3
=
42
12
= 3.5
Judging the accuracy of these ratings can also be done in a way similar to the
analysis of the accuracy of the trust calculations. For each movie the user has rated, the
recommended rating can be compared to the actual rating that the user assigned. In this
analysis, we also compare the actual rating with the average rating. Most movie rating
websites do not personalize ratings, and the average number of stars assigned is the most
common scheme to find. For the trust-based method of calculating ratings, the difference
between the personalized rating and the actual rating should be significantly smaller than
the difference between the actual rating and the average rating.
On first analysis, it did not appear that that the personalized ratings offered any
benefit over the average. The difference between the actual rating and the recommended
rating (call this ∂r) was not statistically different than the difference between the actual
rating and the average rating (call this ∂a). A close look at the data suggested why. Most
of the time, the majority of users actual ratings are close to the average. Of course, it
should be expected that there is a relatively normal distribution of ratings around the
mean, and that a large percentage of ratings will fall close to that mean. A random
sampling of movies showed that about 50% of all rating were within the range of the
mean +/- a half star (the smallest possible increment). For these users, a personalized
rating could not offer much benefit because, in this case, if the recommended rating is
close to the actual rating, it is also close to the average. Since most people tend to assign
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ratings close to the mean, we expect that the average rating will be just as good as a
personalized rating for most cases.
The point of the recommended rating is more to provide useful information to
people who disagree with the average. For example, when users joined the network, they
were asked to rate all of the movies they had seen that were in the top 50 on  the
American Film Institute's 100 Years 100 Films list (American Film Institute, 2000). Just
by the fact that they were on this list, it is reasonable to expect that the average rating will
be relatively high. Indeed, among these films the average rating is between 3 and 3.5
stars. At the same time, for nearly every film there is a small population of users who
have given very low ratings, often of only 0.5 stars – the lowest rating in the system.
Reasons for disliking these movies are personal matters of taste. People who have a
distaste for westerns will probably give low ratings to a movie like "High Noon". In those
cases, the personalized rating should give the user a better recommendation, because we
expect the people they trust will have tastes similar to their own (Ziegler, Lausen, 2004b).
To examine the effectiveness of the personal rating to closely approximate the
users' actual rating when the ∂a increases, both ∂a and ∂r were calculated with various
minimum thresholds on the ∂a value. If the recommended ratings do not offer a benefit
over the average rating, the ∂r values will increase at the same rate the ∂a values do. The
experiment was conducted by limiting ∂a in increments of 0.5. The first set of
comparisons was taken with no threshold, where the difference between ∂a and ∂r was
not significant. As the minimum ∂a value was raised it selected a smaller group of user-
film pairs where the users made ratings that differed increasingly with the average.
Obviously, we expect the average ∂a value will increase by about 0.5 at each increment,
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and that it will be somewhat higher than the minimum threshold. The real question is how
the ∂r will be impacted. If it increases at the same rate, then the recommended ratings do
not offer much benefit over the simple average. If it increases at a slower rate, that means
that, as the user strays from the average, the recommended rating more closely reflects
their opinions. Figure 7.4 illustrates the results of these comparisons.
Figure 7.4: Average ∂a and ∂r values for an increasing minimum ∂a threshold. The results
here show that as ∂a increases, and users' ratings become increasingly distant from the
average, that the recommended rating stays closer to the users ratings. This is reflected by
the slow increase in the ∂r value relative to the ∂a.
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Notice that the ∂a value increases about as expected. The ∂r, however, is clearly
increasing at a slower rate than ∂a. At each step, as the lower threshold for ∂a is increased
by 0.5, ∂r increases by an average of less than 0.1. A two-tailed t-test shows that at each
step where the minimum ∂a threshold is greater than or equal to 0.5, the recommended
rating is significantly closer to the actual rating than the average rating is, with p<0.01.
For about 25% of the ratings assigned, ∂a<0.5, and the user's ratings are about the same
as the mean. For the other 75% of the ratings, ∂a>0.5, and the recommended rating
significantly outperforms the average.
Figure 7.3 illustrates one of the examples where the recommended value reflects
the user's tastes. The user's rating of "Jaws" is 4 stars, while the average is only 2.5 stars
(∂a = 1.5). The recommended rating, on the other hand, is 3.5 stars (∂r=0.5), much closer
to the user's actual opinion. Figure 7.5 shows an even clearer example. "A Clockwork
Orange" is one of the films in the database that has a strong collective of users who hated
the movie, even though the average rating was 3 stars and many users gave it a full 4-star
rating. For the user shown, ∂a=2.5 – a very high value – while the recommended rating
exactly matches the user's low rating of 0.5 stars. These are precisely the type of cases
that the recommended rating is designed to address.
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Figure 7.5: A user's view of the page for "A Clockwork Orange," where the
recommended rating matches the user's rating, even though ∂a is very high (∂a = 2.5).
Thus, when the user's rating of a movie is different than the average rating, it is
likely that the recommended rating will more closely reflect the user's tastes. When the
user has different tastes than the population at large, the recommended rating reflects
that. When the user has tastes that align with the mean, the recommended rating also
aligns with the mean. Based on these findings, the recommended ratings should be useful
when people have never seen a movie. Since they accurately reflect the users' opinions of
movies they have already seen, it follows that they should also reflect how the users will
like a movie that they have not seen. This is not the typical behavior of a recommender
system, in that it does not generate a list of recommendations for the user, but it can help
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users decide whether or not a movie is within their tastes. Because the rating is
personalized, originating from a social network, it is also in line with other results
(Swearigen, Sinha, 2001; Sinha, Swearigen, 2001) that show users prefer
recommendations from friends and trusted systems.
These results show that the trust-based recommendations are more accurate than
the simple average in some cases, but there are many other mechanisms for
recommending how much a user may like a given item. Among Automated Collaborative
Filtering (ACF) algorithms, one algorithm that has been well tested is the classic user-to-
user nearest neighbor prediction algorithm based on Pearson Correlation (Herlocker, et
al., 2002). Correlation values between the user and another person in the system are
computed by finding the Pearson correlation of the user's movie ratings and the other
person's movie ratings. If the correlation is negative, meaning that the two people tend to
give opposite ratings, the person is ignored. To compute a recommended rating for a
specific item, the algorithm computes the weighted average of the ratings for that item.
The average is weighted by the correlation values of everyone in the network who rated
that item.
This algorithm was run on the FilmTrust network, repeating the same experiments
as above. The difference between a user's actual rating of a film and the ACF calculated
rating is given by ∂cf. As is shown in Figure 6, ∂cf closely follows ∂a. As with the
previous analysis, the comparison was made over a series of increasing minimum ∂a
values. For ∂a<1, there was no significant difference between the accuracy of the ACF
ratings and the trust-based recommended rating. However, when the gap between the
actual rating and the average increases, for ∂a>=1, the trust-based recommendation
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outperforms the ACF as well as the average, with p<0.01. These results are illustrated in
Figure 7.6. Because the ACF algorithm is only capturing overall correlation, it is tracking
the average because most users' ratings are close to the average.
Figure 7.6: The increase in ∂ as the minimum ∂a is increased. Notice that the ACF-based
recommendation (∂cf) closely follows the average (∂a). The more accurate Trust-based
recommendation (∂r) significantly outperforms both other methods.
One potential drawback to creating recommendations based solely on
relationships in the social network is that a recommendation cannot be calculated when
there are no paths from the source to any people who have rated a movie. This case is
rare, though, because as long as just one path can be found, a recommendation can be
made. In the FilmTrust network, when the user has made at least one social connection, a
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recommendation can be made for 95% of the user-movie pairs. However, for users who
are isolated from the network, having listed no one as friends, it is impossible to calculate
a recommendation because there is no way to judge the trustworthiness of other people in
the network. Forty-six percent of the users in the network had not created links to any
friends; counting the movies rated by these people, an overall 60% of the user-movie
pairs can be rated.
The purpose of this work is not necessarily to replace more traditional methods of
collaborative filtering. It is very possible that a combined approach of trust with
correlation weighting or another form of collaborative filtering may offer equal or better
accuracy, and it will certainly allow for higher coverage. However, these results clearly
show that, in the FilmTrust network, basing recommendations on the expressed trust for
other people in the network offers significant benefits for accuracy.
7.3.2   Presenting Ordered Reviews
In addition to presenting personalized ratings, the experience of reading reviews is
also personalized. The reviews are presented in order of the trust value of the author, with
the reviews from the most trustworthy people appearing at the top, and those from the
least trustworthy at the bottom. The expectation is that the most relevant reviews will
come from more trusted users, and thus they will be shown first.
Unlike the personalized ratings, measuring the accuracy of the review sort is not
possible without requiring users to list the order in which they suggest the reviews
appear. Without performing that sort of analysis, much of the evidence presented so far
supports this ordering. The definition of trust has been used to support many of the
calculations made throughout this dissertation. That definition also supports the ordering
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of reviews. Trust with respect to movies means that the user believes that the trusted
person will give good and useful information about the movies. The analysis from section
3 also suggests that more trusted individuals will give more accurate information. It was
shown there that trust correlates with the accuracy of ratings. Reviews will be written in
line with ratings (i.e. a user will not give a high rating to a movie and then write a poor
review of it), and since ratings from highly trusted users are more accurate, it follows that
reviews should also be more accurate.
7.4   User Study
In order to understand what benefit, if any, the trust-based personalization of the
website gave to users, I conducted a small usability study of the FilmTrust website.
The study comprised 9 subjects, 5 males and 4 females. All of the subjects had at
least some college education and several had masters degrees. They ranged in age from
25-36. All of the subjects were frequent internet users, with all but one logging on daily.
The subjects were also frequent movie watchers; all of them watched movies at home or
in the theater about once a week. There was more of a range regarding the frequency at
which subjects looked at movie websites and other types of media about films and the
movie industry. Subjects' experience ranged from occasional use each month to daily use.
All of them had established accounts with FilmTrust and logged on once or twice beyond
the initial registration.
Subjects were asked to log in and then proceed to use the FilmTrust site as they
normally would for approximately 15 minutes. After some of their normal usage patterns
were observed, the users were directed to perform a few simple tasks: add or remove a
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friend, rate a movie, write a review, and to give some feedback about the personalized
information shown with the movies.
None of the users experienced any problem completing the basic tasks. Everyone
was able to find movies, rate them, read and write reviews without difficulty.
One area where feedback was of particular interest was in the effectiveness of the
review sorting. The movie "E.T. the Extra Terrestrial" had been rated by 60% of the users
in the system. It also had four reviews written by people who had rated it 1.5 stars with a
negative rating, 3 stars with a mediocre rating, 3 stars with a positive rating, and 4 stars
with a glowing rating. The subjects had a range of opinions about the movie, and this
made it a good choice for testing how well users agreed with the ordering of the reviews.
Subjects were asked to look at the reviews and say which most accurately
reflected their views and which were less accurate. Subjects read the reviews and
generally commented one by one on their opinion of it. They made no comment about the
ordering of the reviews in this process. However, after going through each item it was
pointed out to the subjects that the ordering was made by inferring the trust value for the
author and putting the reviews from more highly rated authors first, and lower-rated
authors last. After they were told this, the subjects generally looked back at the reviews
and realized that they were in an order that closely corresponded with their opinions.
Most of the subjects were very excited when they realized this. One user responded,
"They are in exactly the order I would rank them. That's amazing!" Another said, "That's
so cool. I agree with them and the sequence they're in." Several users pointed out that
they thought the website should explicitly state that the reviews were sorted according to
each user's personal preferences so that everyone would be aware of the benefit offered
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by the ordering. This was a nice anecdotal validation of the analysis that lead to the
incorporation of this feature.
Because each subject had different ratings relative to the average, little time was
spent on determining whether or not the recommended ratings were more accurate. This
was already supported by the actual results above. However, two subjects mentioned that
they had occasionally used the recommended rating as a guide for making their own
ratings. This was not surprising in light of previous work on this subject; Cosley et al.
(2003) suggest that when users are shown a recommended rating in a system, they tend
toward conforming their own rating to the recommended one.
7.5   Conclusions and Discussion
Within the FilmTrust website, trust in social networks has been used to
personalized the user experience. Trust took on the role of a recommender system
forming the core of an algorithm to create predictive rating recommendations for movies.
The accuracy of the trust-based predicted ratings in this system is significantly better than
the accuracy of a simple average of the ratings assigned to a movie and also the
recommended ratings from a Person-correlation based recommender system. The other
trust-based feature in the site presents movie reviews in order of the calculated
trustworthiness of the authors. Although measuring the quality of this ordering is
difficult, anecdotal evidence from a usability study suggest that users generally agree
with and appreciate this ordering.
This result provides us with some information about how users are encoding trust.
If trust were merely a self-evaluated measure of correlation between two people, we
would expect that the accuracy of the recommendations should be similar to the
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collaborative filtering based results (that use an actual correlation measure). The fact that,
in this system, trust is much more effective for making recommendations when the user
has an opinion differing from the average suggests that trust values also capture the
specific notion of the correlation between users on outlying values. The correlation of
these outlying values is not captured by an overall correlation measure.
 One user of the FilmTrust system commented on this: "If we are half-a-star
different on a lot of the movies I don't care about, that doesn't affect my trust value as
much as the fact that you really hated Titanic, too." That correlation, when users are
particularly passionate about a film, does seem to fit in with the notion of trust as leading
the user to a "good outcome". If Bob recommends a movie with a rating of 3.5 stars, and
Alice sees it and decides to rate it 3 stars, the difference of a half star has not done much
to violate the terms of trust; Bob's information still lead to a good outcome for Alice (he
predicted approximately how much she would like the movie). However, if Bob
recommends the movie at 3.5 stars and Alice sees it and rates it at 0.5 stars, then Bob has
given Alice information that lead her to waste her time seeing a movie she didn't like at
all. When approached from the perspective of the definition of trust, it makes sense that
trust should particularly capture correlation in those outlying points.
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Chapter 8
TrustMail: Trust Networks for Email Filtering
8.1   Background and Introduction
The fact that spam has become such a ubiquitous problem with email has lead to
much research and development of algorithms that try to identify spam and prevent it
from even reaching the user’s mailbox. Many of those techniques have been highly
successful, catching and filtering a majority of Spam messages that a person receives.
Though work still continues to refine these methods, some focus has shifted to
new mechanisms for blocking unwanted messages and highlighting good, or valid,
messages. “Whitelist” filters are one of these methods. In these systems, users create a
list of approved addresses from which they will accept messages. Any whitelisted
messages are delivered to the user’s inbox, and all others are filtered into a low-priority
folder. These systems do not claim that all of the filtered messages will be spam, but
rather that a whitelist makes the inbox more usable by only showing messages that are
definitely not spam. Though whitelists are nearly 100% effective at blocking unwanted
email, there are two major problems cited with them. Firstly, there is an extra burden
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placed on the user to maintain a whitelist, and secondly, valid emails will almost certainly
be filtered into the low-priority mailbox.  If that box contains a lot of spam, the valid
messages will be especially difficult to find.
Other approaches have used social networks for message filtering. In [1] Boykin
and Roychowdhury create a social network from the messages that a user has received.
Using the structural properties of social networks, particularly the propensity for local
clustering, messages are identified as spam, valid, or unknown based on clustering
thresholds. Their method is able to classify about 50% of a user’s email into the spam or
valid categories, leaving 50% to be filtered by other techniques.
Our approach takes some of the basic premises of whitelisting and social network
based filtering and extends them. Unlike Boykin and Roychowdhury’s technique that
builds a social network from the user’s own email folders, the trust-based technique uses
a network that connects users. The algorithm from chapter 6 determines a trust rating for
each sender that becomes the score for the email message.
The scoring system preserves the whitelist benefit of making the inbox more
usable by making “good” messages prominent. The added benefit is that scores will also
appear next to messages from people with whom the user has never has contact before.
That is because, if they are connected through a mutual acquaintance in the reputation
network, a rating can be inferred. This diminishes some of the problems with whitelists
because, since scores are inferred instead of taken directly from a list,  fewer valid
messages will be filtered into a low-priority mail folder. Though some burden for
creating an initial set of reputation ratings does fall on the user, it is possible to rate fewer
people and rely on the inferred ratings.
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The goal of this scoring system is not to give low ratings to bad senders, thus
showing low numbers next to spam messages in the inbox. The main premise is to
provide higher ratings to non-spam senders, so users are able to identify messages of
interest that they might not otherwise have recognized. This puts a lower burden on the
user, since there is no need to rate all of the spam senders.
Because of this focus, this algorithm is not intended to be a solution to spam by
itself; rather, it is a technique for use in conjunction with a variety of other anti-spam
mechanisms. There are some spam issues that particularly effect this algorithm. Forged
email headers, or spoofing, where the "From:" line of a message is altered to look like a
valid address is one such issue. This work is not designed to address this problem, and
some other technique must deal with forged headers. Because this technique is designed
to identify good messages that make it past spam filters, it also do not address the case
where a person has a virus sending messages from their account. Other spam-detection
techniques will be required to flag these messages.
Essentially, trust is integrated into the email client to serve as a tool for ranking
and filtering messages according to their presumed importance. This is not the first
technique developed for this task. Maxims (Lasharki et al., 1994) is an agent integrated
with an email client that learns how to filter, delete, and archive messages based on user
actions. While my work takes a social network-based approach to the problem of
message filtering instead of an agent-based approach, the two methods are not
contradictory; they could, in fact, be integrated into a system as complementary in the
task of easing email overload.
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8.2   The TrustMail Application
TrustMail is a prototype email client that adds trust ratings to the folder views of a
message. This allows a user to see their trust rating for each individual, and sort messages
accordingly. This is, essentially, a message scoring system. The benefit to users is that
relevant and potentially important messages can be highlighted, even if the user does not
know the sender. The determination of whether or not a message is significant is made
using the user's own perspective on the trust network, and thus scores will be
personalized to and under the control of each user.
Figure 8.1: The TrustMail Interface. In this window, messages are sorted according to the
trust rating of the sender, with the most trusted appearing highest in the list.
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The values shown next to each message are trust ratings calculated with the
recipient as the source, and the sender as the sink. In Figure 8.1, the Trust Project social
network is used as the foundation. The continuous algorithm from Chapter 6 is applied to
make the trust inferences since the Trust Project network uses a 1-10 scale for rating
trust.
The ratings alongside messages are useful, not only for their value, but because
they basically replicate the way trust relationships work in social settings. For example,
today, it would sensible and polite for a student emailing a professor she has never met to
start the email with some indication of the relationships between the student and the two
professors, e.g., “My advisor has collaborated with you on this topic in the past and she
suggested I contact you.” The professor may chose to verify the validity of this statement
by contacting the student's advisor or finding information that verifies the claim. These
ratings are developed by consulting the social network and ratings within it, and serve as
evidence of mutual, trusted acquaintances.
TrustMail replaces the process of searching for information about a recipient by
utilizing the data in web-based social networks. Because calculations are made from the
perspective of the email recipient, high ratings will have necessarily have come through
people the recipient trusts. This allows the trust network-based system to complement
spam filters by identifying good messages that might otherwise be indistinguishable from
unwanted messages, and carrying the validation of a rating drawn from the users own
network of trusted acquaintances.
Techniques that build social networks from messages that the user has sent or
received can identify whether or not a message has come from someone in the network.
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However, because they are built only from the user's local mail folders, no information is
available about people that the user has not previously seen. If the user's personal
network is connected in to a larger social network with information from many other
users, much more data is available. Previously unseen senders can be identified as part of
the network.
Furthermore, since trust values are available in the system, the methods for
inferring trust can be applied to present more information to the user about the sender of a
message. In the FilmTrust system, it was shown that users benefited from having ratings
sorted by the trustworthiness of the author. These results are the basis for sorting
messages by the trustworthiness of the sender in TrustMail. However, unlike the
FilmTrust where every review was authored by someone in the social network, people
will undoubtedly receive many email messages from people who are not in their social
network. To understand what benefit TrustMail might offer to users, it is important to
understand what percentage of messages we can expect to have ratings for in TrustMail.
The next section uses a real email corpus to gain some insight into this question.
8.3   Case Study: The Enron Email Corpus
To gain some insight into how TrustMail may impact a user's mailbox, a large
network with many users is required. Although the Trust Project had about two-thousand
members, it is not ideal for this type of analysis because it only connects a small
community of users, and thus it would only be possible to analyze the mailboxes of a few
users. The ultimate application of TrustMail would involve a much larger network or a
better connected community. Since this type of social network with trust ratings was not
available to test TrustMail, it had to be generated from other existing data.
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The Enron email dataset is a collection of the mail folders of 150 Enron
employees, and it contains over 1.5 million messages, both sent and received. There are
over 6,000 unique senders in the corpus, and over 28,000 unique recipients. These
numbers are much greater than the number of users whose mailboxes have been collected
because they represent everyone who has sent a message to the users, everyone who has
been cc-ed on a message to the users, and everyone the users have emailed. The
collection was made available by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in late
2003 in response to the legal investigation of the company. Because the messages
represent a single community, they are ideal for analyzing the potential of TrustMail.
Each message in the corpus was read, and an edge was added from the sender to each of
the recipients. This produced an initial social network, although the connections are
weak. To be more sure that the links between people represented a relationship,
connections were removed for any interactions that occurred only once; edges were only
added from source to sink when the source had emailed the sink at least twice.
This social network is obviously lacking trust values. While the strength of
relationships could be derived from the corpus of messages, this measure would not
correlate to trust as it was defined in chapter 3. Specifically, the justification for the
transitivity and composability do not carry through to measures of the strength of
relationships. Instead of creating data, the trust component will not be used in the
analysis. Relying on the previous results from chapters 6 and 7 to justify the benefits of
sorting messages by trust, it is reasonable to conclude that users will see a benefit from
sorting messages according to the trustworthiness of the sender. What is unclear in
TrustMail is how many messages will actually be rated.
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The Enron data allows us to see exactly who has emailed each user. A list of all
individuals who sent mail to a given user is compiled. The network is searched for a path
from the recipient to each sender. These calculations allow us to determine, in this email
corpus, what percentage of senders could be given trust ratings if there were actually a
trust network supporting the Enron users.
An analysis of the Enron network showed the following statistics:
• 37% of recipients had direct connections to people who sent them email in the social
network; in other words, 37% of the time the recipient had emailed the sender of a
received message.
• 55% of senders who were not directly connected to the recipient could be reached
through paths in the social network.
• Thus, a total of 92% of all senders can be rated if trust values were present in the
social network.
These numbers indicate that users in a community like Enron, an application like
TrustMail can provide information about a majority of the incoming messages. While the
Enron corpus is a close community of users, it is reasonable to expect that, if users are
properly supported in making trust ratings as part of their email client, a similarly high
percentage of senders and messages would receive ratings.
8.4   Conclusions
This chapter introduced TrustMail, an email client that uses a trust network and
algorithms for inferring trust to score each email message. Users are able to sort their
mail folders according to the trustworthiness of the sender. An analysis of the structure of
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the Enron corpus showed that users can expect a majority of their messages to receive
ratings if a well-connected trust network is available to support the application.
While the Enron email corpus represents a natural community of users, there are
other natural communities where social networks could easily be combined with mail.
For example, services like AOL or MSN could include a trust rating option in instant
messaging buddy lists, and integrate this into their email applications. Google, for
example, already has a social network with trust ratings, through its affiliation with
Orkut, and an email application in Gmail. The two could be joined, connecting millions
of social network users together.
When users feel they are receiving a benefit from using the trust ratings next to
email messages, this encourages them to create more and more accurate trust ratings of
people they know. This, in turn, improves the accuracy of the inferred ratings and the
number of messages that can be rated. If this cycle is encouraged with a user interface
that allows users to easily make trust ratings, trust rated email may become an effective
method of email filtering.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
The goal of this dissertation was to show that trust relationships in web-based
social networks can be used to create applications that offer some benefit to the user by
integrating their social preferences. The results presented here show that the benefit is
real.
The major contributions of this work are,
1. A formalization of trust as a computational concept within web-based social
networks through a definition and description of the functional properties of trust
that follow from the definition (Chapter 3)
2. A set of algorithms for inferring trust that have been demonstrated to be accurate
(Chapters 5 and 6)
3. The FilmTrust website which shows that trust-based recommendations create
significantly more accurate predictive movie recommendations than the simple
average or those produced by a collaborative filtering technique when the user's
opinion differs from the average. (Chapter 7)
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This dissertation has been presented as a walk through the specific intellectual
steps necessary to conclude that applications that integrate trust in web-based social
networks can, in fact, offer a benefit to the user.
Before any algorithms are created or applications developed that use a social
networking technique, several prerequisites that must be met:
1. There must be sufficient social network data on the web to motivate its use in
applications. Without a large, active community of people participating in the
networks, the incentive to create software around the networks does not exist.
2. Social network data must be publicly available. If each new piece of software
requires the creation and growth of a new social network, it is unlikely that it will
reach a large community. Optimally, socially inspired software will use networks
that already exist on the web.
The social network survey presented in Chapter 3 shows that these criteria are
definitely satisfied. With over 133 million user accounts in 127 networks, it is clear that
the web is a place alive with social networking activities. Part of the definition I put forth
for websites to qualify as web-based social networks is that the social connections must
be browsable by others in the system. This means that the data is public in at least that
minimal sense. Applications can spider these networks to build models of the social
connections, if necessary. However, the Semantic Web offers a much better alternative.
The Friend-of-a-Friend project (FOAF) is centered around a vocabulary, presented in the
Web Ontology Language (OWL), for describing people and their social connections.
Because of the nature of the Semantic Web, where distributed information can be linked
together, all of the FOAF files can be merged into a single social network model.
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According to current estimates, there are over 6 million people with FOAF files, most of
which are automatically generated by social networking websites included in the survey.
FOAF data is totally accessible to any software application, and because FOAF is one of
the most popular efforts on the Semantic Web, it is likely that developers will have
support from a variety of online sources if they choose to base their applications on the
FOAF network.
The state of social networks on the web is clearly strong enough to justify
developing applications around them. The next step in my work requires trust to be
integrated into the social networks. In order for users to effectively express trust, and for
developers to make computations with it, there must be a clear definition tailored to the
nature of how relationship information is expressed in web-based social networks. In
chapter 4, I develop such a definition. For two people, Alice and Bob, I define trust as
follows: Alice trusts Bob if she commits to an action based on a belief that Bob's future
actions will lead to a good outcome.
Computational properties of trust follow from this definition. Specifically, I have
described in what way trust can be considered transitive over paths between two
individuals, as well as its composability, asymmetry, and personalization.  These
properties lead to the capacity for making calculations with trust.
The core computational question using trust in web-based social networks is that
of inferring relationships. Given two people (a source and a sink) who are not directly
connected, can we use the information in the network to infer how much the source might
trust the sink? I present two approaches to making trust inferences based on the values of
trust expressed in the network.
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The first algorithms, presented in chapter 5, are for networks where trust is
expressed as a binary value: either trust or no trust. When those values are treated
numerically, with 1 for trust and 0 for no trust, many nice statistical properties follow. If
one node is chosen as a source, then every other node in the network will either return a
correct or incorrect rating of the sink from the perspective of the source. With the simple
algorithm introduced, the probability of a correct inference at a given search depth can be
modeled with a binomial distribution. An application of the Central Limit Theorem leads
to the conclusion that we can expect a highly accurate inference for the source when the
initial accuracy in the network (given by the percentage of ratings made in the network
that are accurate from the perspective of the source) is greater than 0.5. With the
promising results from chapter 5, I move to the more complex problem of making trust
inferences when there is a continuous range of values to represent trust.
In the binary-valued networks, computer-generated networks were ideal because
they allowed for manipulation of certain parameters to understand the behavior of the
algorithm. For continuous-valued networks, the number of parameters is far more
complex, and real web-based social networks with trust values were more appropriate. To
that end, I launched two projects designed to build these networks. The first, the Trust
Project, is an entirely Semantic Web-based network. I created the FOAF Trust Module, a
small extension to the FOAF vocabulary that allows users to express how much trust they
have for one another. The Trust Project crawls the web for FOAF files that include trust
information, and that information is built into a central model. The size of the network
continues to grow, and currently has about 2,000 members. The second network grew
with the FilmTrust project, a website that combines a trust network with a movie ratings
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and reviews. That more traditional web-based social network, where users have accounts
and sign in to a central system, has about 400 members. Both networks allow users to rat
the trustworthiness of others on a scale from 1 (low trust) to 10 (high trust). These two
networks became the testbed for experiments involving continuous valued networks.
The algorithms used for computing trust inferences in binary networks are too
simple in their treatment of trust to be directly translated for use in continuous networks;
in binary networks, there is no differentiating between trusted people – each is trusted
equally. In continuous networks, the values within the network are more complex, and
the values to be returned – the inferred trust rating – also must be within the scale of trust,
not a binary value. To make the transition, it is first important to have an understanding
of how trust and the depth of a search affect accuracy. An analysis of the two trust
networks described above showed that higher trusted neighbors tend to agree with a user
more than lower trusted neighbors, and that nodes connected by shorter paths tend to
agree more than nodes connected by longer paths.
This information is integrated into TidalTrust, the algorithm for inferring trust in
continuous networks. Using the same Breadth First Search-based approach to searching
for paths as was used in the binary-valued networks, TidalTrust looks for the shortest and
most trusted paths. When TidalTrust was compared to the Beth-Borcherding-Klein
algorithm in the Trust Project and FilmTrust networks, it produced statistically
significantly mode accurate trust inferences. These measures of accuracy are not
particularly interesting alone; to see the implications of the TidalTrust algorithm, it
should be used in an application and judged by its performance there.
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The FilmTrust website is the main place the usefulness of these trust inferences
has been tested. On the site, users build a social network, rating how much they trust their
friends' opinions about movies. They also can write reviews about films and rate them on
a scale from half a star (very bad) to four stars (excellent).
Traditionally, websites that have offered users information about movies have
presented an average of all ratings assigned to those films. Recommender systems and
collaborative filtering algorithms have tried to personalize the information shown to the
user. The rating shown in these systems is known as a predictive recommendation, since
it estimates what rating the users might assign to the movie if they see it.  In collaborative
filtering systems, the user sees a weighted average of the ratings assigned to the film.
Those weights usually originate from some measure of correlation between the user and
the person who has rated the movie. In FilmTrust, users are shown a predictive rating
based on trust rather than a direct measure of correlation. Ratings from more trusted
individuals receive a higher weight than rating from lower trusted individuals.
In the general case, looking at every user and every movie, the simple average
rating assigned to a movie is just as accurate as the predictive rating from a traditional
collaborative filtering algorithm or from the trust-based algorithm. However, as the user's
opinion about a movie diverges from the average, I have shown that the trust based
recommendation significantly outperforms both the simple average and correlation-based
collaborative filtering approach.
This suggests that users are capturing more than just correlation when they rate
how much they trust people. While there is an established link between trust and rating
correlations (Ziegler, Lausen, 2004b), trust also seems to specifically capture some
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information about correlation in those outlying points. One user of the FilmTrust system
commented on this: "If we are half-a-star different on a lot of the movies I don't care
about, that doesn't affect my trust value as much as the fact that you really hated Titanic,
too." This feature of trust works nicely in the context of the definition of trust, since
disagreement on the movies where the user has an extreme opinion will violate the "good
outcome" expected from a trusted person much more than a small difference in ratings
for movies where the user has an average opinion.
The results from these predictive ratings is a strong confirmation that trust can be
used in applications, and that it does, in fact, capture the opinion of users. The second
feature of FilmTrust to use trust ratings is the review sorting mechanism. For each movie,
the user is shown all of the reviews that have been written. Those reviews are ordered
according to the inferred trust value of the author from the perspective of the user. The
goal is to show reviews from more trusted individuals more prominently. A small user
study produced an enthusiastic response for this ordering, but a more in-depth study will
be required to obtain more informative results.
Following on the insights gained from the FilmTrust website, I introduce a second
application, TrustMail. This is an email client that uses the inferred trust value from the
recipient to the sender as a score for the message. The user can order their mailbox
according to this trust value, to show messages from more trusted users first. The results
from the FilmTrust experiments suggest that this can be an effective mechanism for
sorting messages. In addition to the actual trust value next to each message, the social
network implications mean that messages from unknown people can come in with high
ratings because of strong connections between the sender and the recipient.
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Taken together, these results show that integrating trust in web-based social
networks into applications can enrich the user's experience. There is ample data available
on the web, and using the algorithms presented here, there is evidence that trust-based
features can provide insights and enhancements to applications by respecting the user's
social context.
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Chapter 10
Future Work
There are many ways to continue and extend the work presented in this
dissertation. Section 10.1 describes extensions of the FilmTrust system and the analyses
of the trust networks. I have also begun other projects utilizing trust inferences, presented
in section 10.2, and plan to carry that work into full implementation. Finally, I have
chosen trust in social networks as a specific instance of the larger problem of inferring
relationships in complex systems that forms the core of my research interests. I have done
some work in spaces where a similar approach can be applied. Section 10.3 outlines the
Meal of a Meal (MOAM) project, and how it follows from the work here.
10.1   Validation of Current Results
The current results for both the accuracy of the TidalTrust algorithm and its
application within FilmTrust are based on relatively small networks with hundreds of
users. The FilmTrust and Trust Projects were also built up where the users understood
that they were participating in a study.
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To show that the accuracy of the algorithms and the predictive recommendation
results will hold in real systems, they need to be used in much larger networks. That
could be done with an implementation in an existing WBSN, or by growing the size of
the current network.
10.2   Extensions to Current Work
There are many aspects of my current work that were outside the scope of this
dissertation. Some of the most immediate future work will be to investigate these
extensions.
10.2.1   Network Structure and Trust Inferences
The two trust networks used in this network exhibit the small world properties
expected of social networks. However, the structure alone is not responsible for the
effectiveness of the trust inferences. There is meaning to the trust ratings on the edges in
the network and, as section 6.2 showed, if the structure is maintained but the trust values
randomized, the correlation between a user's trust ratings and the ratings of trusted
friends disappears.
The algorithms for inferring trust depends on this correlation, and the relatively
high accuracy of the algorithm is a result of it. In a living social network where users
create relationships, delete them, and change their trust rating, the inferred trust ratings
can change day to day. Even if these changes do not have a significant impact on the
structural properties of the network, they have the potential to dramatically impact the
quality of the trust ratings. Consider Figure 10.1.
156
Figure 10.1: A sample social network. In this example, changes in trust values can
significantly affect the quality of trust rating.
In Figure 10.1, nodes A, B, C, and D all have a one path to the sink through node
E. Nodes A and B have a second path through nodes F and G. The path through E is
clearly best: nodes A-D all have rated node E at a 10, and the path has the shortest length
of 2. On the contrary, the alternate path has a longer length, and both nodes A and B
assigned relatively low ratings to node F, the first node on that path.
If node E were to remove the connection to the sink entirely, nodes C and D
would lose the ability to make a trust inference, and nodes A and B would be forced to
use the weaker path. Because it is longer and less trusted, we can expect that there will be
greater error. If E were to change its rating of the sink, nodes A-D would all be affected.
Because nodes C and D receive all of their information about the sink through their
157
connections to node E, any change made by E will pass directly to nodes C and D. While
nodes A and B have an alternate path, we can expect the path through E will have more
weight since it is shorter and more trusted. Thus, a change in E will also strongly impact
nodes A and B. In fact, if TidalTrust is the algorithm being used, nodes A and B
receiving all of their information from the path through node E, since it is the shortest
path. In that case, the impact of a change in E's rating of the sink will be passed directly
to nodes A and B.
Situations similar to that presented in Figure 10.1 can occur when there are hubs
in the network, when a user has very few connections, or when a strongly connected
group of nodes in the network has a small number of paths connecting it to the larger
network. A topic of future research will be to find when changes in one or a small set of
trust values will have a significant impact on the accuracy of the network overall, and
how the properties of the nodes making changes are seated in the network topology.
An understanding of this connection could lead to more complex algorithms that
cope with changes in key nodes more effectively. Because other complex systems will
likely have a similar structure, this insight may have future implications for other systems
where relationships are inferred.
10.2.2   Recommendations with FilmTrust
FilmTrust was designed to serve as a testbed for the hypothesis that basing
predictive recommendations entirely on trust was an effective and accurate. The goal was
not to create an optimal recommender system. Previous work (Massa, Bhattacharjee,
2004) has suggested that combining trust and traditional collaborative filtering algorithms
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could be effective. One of the most obvious extensions to the FilmTrust work is to
experiment with combinations of different methods for making predictive movie ratings.
Attack resistance is also an important space to do further research in this context.
While the goal of trust-based systems is not to make a totally secure system, in the sense
that no malicious people can get in, there are natural properties of social networking
systems that lead to an inherent ability to prevent bad information from entering the
system. In theory, even if a large percentage of the network were made up of nodes
spreading bad information (be it trust ratings, movie ratings, or other data), the good
nodes in social network should not be affected. Because the algorithms used in this work
make calculations from the user's perspective, the only way malicious nodes could affect
the results shown to the user is if they were incorrectly included as trusted neighbors by a
good node along the way. Since nodes want to preserve the proper function of the system
for themselves, there is little incentive to falsely include bad nodes.
That is a theoretical resistance, though. Because of the social nature of trust and
how it is assigned, some individuals may put other factors ahead of honest and accurate
ratings. This could potentially lead to a deterioration in the accuracy of the results. A
near-term project within the FilmTrust space will look at what conditions generally need
to be met before bad information starts affecting good nodes, and also at how widely and
easily that information can spread into the network. Results from the work described in
section 10.2.1 also can be incorporated into this analysis. Ultimately, identifying ways
that malicious nodes – or nodes that simply disagree with the perspective of the user –
can be eliminated from consideration when social factors allow them in will be an
important step in preserving the quality of the results in the system.
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10.2.3   Privacy
Privacy is vitally important to the successful functioning of any trust and
reputation system. The eBay reputation system is one of the most widely used rating
systems on the web. While it does not capture trust in the same way I have presented it in
this dissertation, it does help highlight some of the issues related to privacy.
On eBay there is a strong disincentive to leave negative feedback to users because
they can retaliate with negative feedback, even if it is undeserved. There is little to no
recourse for this, and so users are often inclined to say nothing, rather than to make a
negative statement. Within web-based social networks, social pressures also make
privacy important. For example, on many social networking websites, when a user adds
someone as a friend, the friend needs to approve the connection. An informal survey of
300 Orkut users showed that approximately 25% of the connections that users had made
were made out of a feeling of obligation. There is a social message that is sent when a
friendship request is declined, and users often prefer to add an unwanted friend than to
offend the person. When trust is involved, issues become even more complex. If a system
relies on honest trust information to function properly, it is important that users do not
feel pressured to manipulate their trust values away from what they truly believe. If those
trust values are public, people can feel obligated to give higher ratings to friends to avoid
offending them. In the Trust Project phase of this work, trust ratings were often publicly
visible on the web or otherwise discernable through the network. Many users complained
about this, and in FilmTrust the system was altered to make trust ratings totally private.
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Finding the proper balance between privacy and public access to the data is a
difficult question.  One space that this work can be extended is to look at how this might
be accomplished, and how it would vary across applications.
10.3   Filtering Semantic Web Statements with Trust
Information – in particular, “content” – on the World Wide Web is presented with
an expectation that the information consumer is a human being. People are expected to
make use of a variety of cues to ascertain, for example, the proponent of a claim, the
author of an article, or the photographer who took a photo and to distinguish these from
the refuter of that claim, the publisher of the article, and the aggregator of the photos.
Most of these cues are traditional: bylines, attributions, quotations, citations, authorial
claims, copyright notices, and the like. Some cues derive from features of Web
architecture, such as the use of the Domain Name System (DNS) in Universal Resource
Identifiers (URIs), or HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) redirects. Digital signatures
can be used to verify the particular origin of a document, and that the document was
unchanged in transit, but there is no provision for relating the authenticity of the source of
the document and the trustworthiness of the content of that document. Human judgment
is required to determine the nature of the document and its content (e.g., real purchase
order, example order for debugging, or a parody for amusement). One way that the need
for continual human intervention can be eliminated is for people and organizations to set
up agreements that certain documents exchanged in certain contexts will be reliable in the
appropriate ways. Given that the parties of such agreements all trust each other, accepting
information reduces to verifying that it came from a trusted source. Such acceptance need
not be only the acceptance of that information as true — the modality of the acceptance
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depends on the agreements. On a community website content may be acceptable for its
entertainment value.
The Semantic Web is conceived as the "next generation" of the World Wide Web,
wherein much of the content of the Web will not be solely, or even primarily, intended
for human consumption. Instead, content sensitive programs will collect, process,
exchange, generate, and make decisions based on Web accessible information. As Web
agents make more significant decisions, it become more imperative that they are more
sophisticated in how they accept information from the Web. While many Semantic Web
programs will have significant domain knowledge and thus, presumably, some built-in
methods for evaluating the plausibility of new information, perhaps the majority of them
will be less specialized. Thus, there is a need for more general, not content specific,
techniques.
Many websites are open, in that nigh anyone can submit information to be
published on the site. This can range from very restricted submissions, such as comments
on articles, to the entire content of the site, as with Wikis. This is relatively
unproblematic when the information submitted is always presented as a cohesive chunk,
say, a Wikipage, or a specific comment, or a specific blog entry. This permits the human
reader to evaluate both the content of the chunk and the context of submission (i.e., the
provenance).
In contrast, in an open Semantic Website, this is not sufficient. For example,
http://www.mindswap.org/ is an open, RDF and OWL driven website. It accepts
relatively arbitrary submission of bits of RDF and OWL. It incorporates the assertions in
a submission in a variety of pages, presenting the assertions in contexts divorced from
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their submission and using those assertions to draw inferences, which are themselves
presented on different pages. The page generation software has to decide how and where
to present or otherwise use each assertion in a submission.
A future application of trust calculations and web-based social networks is as a
method for rating and filtering a set of assertions. The provenance information indicates
the creator of a statement, and the inferred trust value for that person is used to compose
ratings of the reputation or trustworthiness of assertions. Those ratings on assertions can
then be used to filter the set of statements used in an application, thereby creating a
knowledge base with a known level of validity.
10.3.1  From Trust Network Inferences to Accepting Claims
 A claim is simply any RDF triple submitted to our website, whether by a Web
form, via some aggregation mechanism such as an RSS feed, or by a Web service API.
Triples are typically submitted in batches, that I will call “snippets”, with user-supplied
metadata about the snippet inherited by each claim. For example, on
http://www.mindswap.org/ users can submit snippets about papers they have authored,
either through a free form textarea to craft their RDF directly by hand, or simple
elicitation forms to help ensure data consistency, coherence, and completeness.
The key metadata for each snippet is the person submitting the claim, that is, the
claimant. When a claimant is identifiable as a particular node in the trust network, we can
attempt to determine a local trust rating for that claimant. If a user of the site has
registered their trust network identifier with the site, then trust rating can be inferred to
the claimant with the user's node as the source. Given a particular trust rating for a claim,
we customize the display behavior of the site. The simplest customization is to suppress
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the display of any claim from a claimant whose trust rating is below a certain, user-
configurable threshold.
The situation is slightly more complex if there are multiple claimants for a
particular claim. There are a number of functions one could use to derive a trust rating for
the claim based on the set of ratings for the claimants. However, the straightforward
solution – take the maximum rating of the claimants – has a great deal of intuitive
plausibility. Since the kind of web sites for which this filtering technique is intended are
community oriented portals, the general goal for the site is to be interesting, relevant, and
useful to that community. Thus, trust in this context is a measure of our belief that a
person will create well-presented, relevant, interesting, and useful information, as
determined by the portal’s community standards. Since the trustworthiness of the
claimant is not interpreted as evidence for or against the claim, there is no need to
average or other balance divergent ratings.
10.3.2 Using Claim Ratings in Semantic Web Systems
The first application of the ratings for claims is to filter the content of the website
based on the value of the rating. The FilmTrust approach to sorting reviews can be
considered a simple application of this idea. Based on the calculated trustworthiness of
the review's author, the user's experience is customized with respect to how the data is
presented.
On a larger scale, consider applying this technology in the context of some of the
many “rumor” sites on the web. As one example, MacRumors (http://macrumors.com)
allows users to submit rumors about news and technology releases related to Apple
Computer.  The author of each rumor is tracked, and community members already have
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the ability to rate rumors as positive or negative. A website with that model could
significantly benefit from a semantically-aware system of trust and provenance. A
network of ratings that reflect one person’s opinion about the quality of posts made by
another user, and a system of generating ratings for statements based on their provenance
creates the groundwork for allowing users to customize the site. For example, users could
choose a minimum trust level of statements that appear on the site. Not only would the
site be personalized, it would be optimized for the user according to their preferences and
social network connections. Although “rumor” sites provide an intuitive example because
of the obvious variation in the credibility of statements, this technique can be applied to
any site where statements originate from a variety of sources.
10.3.3 Filtering Inferences in Knowledge-Bases with Trust Values
Filtering the base claims of the system is useful and interesting, but base claims
on Semantic Web sites form only part of the picture. Semantic Web portals tend to be
oriented around RDFS and OWL ontologies, that is, logical theories of varying degrees
of expressiveness. A Semantic Web site, therefore, is based on a knowledge base and the
character of the web site is significantly influenced by the sorts of reasoning it supports.
The ordering of filtering and inferring is important to consider. If the set of base claims
are filtered first, and then inferences are made over the filtered set, there are two results.
First, using the filtered base claims as the fact base for any inferences already filters the
inferences. This allows users to conclude that any inferred statements should have at least
the same trust rating as the minimum value in the filter, because all of the claims that
allow the inference meet or exceed that minimum. However, this does not provide a
mechanism for actually calculating a value for an inferred statement  - it only sets a
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minimum bound. Using this filter-then-infer method also means that the set of inferred
statements are limited – it is possible that many other statements could have been inferred
from the unfiltered base.
If the order of inferring and filtering is reversed, so all of the inferences are made
over the full set, and then the set of all statements – base and inferred – are filtered, the
issue becomes more complex because it requires that some trust value be established for
the inferred statements. The rating for an inferred statement should be made by some
combination of the ratings for statements that lead to the inference. However, a number
of different statements could lead to an inference.
Consider the following set of base claims in N3. Each statement is marked with a
trust rating calculated from its claimants.
9 :Person a owl:Class .
8 :SpouseOfStudent a owl:Class;
8      rdfs:subClassOf :Person,
8       [a owl:Restriction;
    owl:allValuesFrom :Student;
    owl:onProperty :marriedTo ],
8        [a owl:Restriction;
     owl:cardinality "1";
owl:onProperty :marriedTo ] .
7 :Student a owl: Class;
7          rdfs:subClassOf :Person .
9 :University a owl:Class .
6 :attendsUniversity  a owl:ObjectProperty;
6                     rdfs:domain :Student;
6                     rdfs:range :University .
10  :marriedTo a owl:ObjectProperty;
10             owl:inverseOf :marriedTo .
10  :Daniel  a :SpouseOfStudent;
9            :marriedTo :Jennifer .
8   :Jennifer a :Person;
6             :attendsUniversity :UMCP.
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From this example, we can infer that :Jennifer is a :Student. What should
be the rating for that inferred claim? There are several ways that it can be inferred.
Because Jennifer :attendsUniversity :UMCP (known at level 6), and the
domain of :attendsUniversity is :Student (rated at level 6) , we can infer that
:Jennifer is a :Student. This inference comes from two simple statements, rated
at the same level, so it seems intuitive to rate the inference from these sources at a level 6,
like the composite statements. There are other ways to infer that :Jennifer is a
:Student, though, and they may have a higher rating than the 6 achieved with the first
method. We also know that :Daniel, a :SpouseOfStudent (known at level 10), is
:marriedTo :Jennifer (known at level 9). Since, for instances of the
:SpouseOfStudent class, the object of :marriedTo must be from the class
:Student (known at level 8), and there must be exactly one spouse (because of the
cardinality restriction known at level 8), we know :Jennifer must be the only person
that :Daniel  is :marriedTo , and thus we can infer that :Jennifer is a
:Student. How to combine this series of statements into a rating for the inferred value
is not as clear. .
This example illustrates several issues raised when considering how to rate
inferred statements. For each set of statements that leads to an inference, we need a way
to combine the ratings of the composite statements to come up with a rating for the
inferred statement. Even if we took the simple route of just using the minimum rating
from the set of composite statements as the rating for the inferred statement, there are still
more problems. If a statement is inferred from several sets of statements, there are now
several ratings for that inferred statement. How to choose a final value for the inferred
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statement is not clear. On top of that, the primary issue illustrated by the above example
is that the number of ways a statement can be inferred can grow very quickly. To
consider every possible combination of claims that lead to an inference could become
computationally difficult. Because inferences are such a fundamental issue on the
Semantic Web, the question of establishing trust values for inferred statements is a
critical focus of future work in this space. In my ongoing work in this space, I am looking
at heuristics for choosing the most trustworthy mechanisms of inference, when pre-
filtering by trust can help in this process, and how multiple inference paths might be
synthesized to evaluate the overall trustworthiness of an inferred statement.
10.4   Meal of a Meal: Inferring Trophic Relationships in Food Webs
Food webs are models of trophic relationships in an ecosystem. They are built up
from observations about what each species eats, and what eats it. This data is gathered
from studies of individual species, direct observation, and even examination of stomach
contents. However, it is difficult to directly observe every species consuming every
species in its diet. As a result, many food webs are incomplete. Paleofoodwebs are food
webs assembled from the fossil record, so they are generally much less complete. More
complete food webs allow for conservation, management, and an overall better
understanding of the dynamics of complex ecosystems.
Is there a way to infer trophic relationships in food webs? This requires additional
information. We use taxonomic and phylogenic similarity measures between species to
infer trophic connections. The logic supporting this is that species who are closely related
are likely to eat similar diets. We have named this project Meal of a Meal (MOAM) in a
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nod to the Friend of a Friend (FOAF) project that is used in the Semantic Web
representation of social network data.
Figure 10.2 illustrates a step in the MOAM process. It is observed that species A
eats species B. Then, calculations are made that show species C is closely related to
species A. That is evidence that suggests it may eat the same things, so an inferred
trophic connection from species A is added to species B. Similarly, a second calculation
shows that species D is similar to species B. Thus, we have some evidence that things
that eat species B may also eat species D. This is results in the addition of the edge from
species A to species D. Finally, a weaker link is added from species C to species D. That
uses the inferred connection from species C to species B, and the similarity between
species B and species D.
Each added edge is weighted to indicate the strength of the evidence for the
inferred trophic relationship. It is then left up to an ecological expert to determine which
of these may be viable edges and which are in congruent with ecological reality.
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Figure 10.2: Inferring trophic connections in food webs. Beginning with the known
trophic relationship between species A and species B, this figure illustrates the steps used
to determine the similarity between A and C, and between B and D. Those similarities are
used to then infer trophic relationships between A and D (using 1 step – the
phylogenic/taxonomic similarity between B and D), between C and B (using one step for
the same reason), and between C and D (using two steps: between A and C and between
B and D).
This is a more complex analysis than is required for the social network analysis in
this dissertation. Instead of only one type of relationship, there are two: the trophic and
the phylogenic/taxonomic. With two dimensions of relationships, understanding how to
compose the connections is less clear. We have begun analyzing lake-based food webs
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with this tool and are presenting the results to the ecological community for analysis.
Eventually, steps will be taken to refine the similarity measures between species and
understand how path lengths affect the number of accurate inferred trophic relationships.
Research in this space is underway with Neo Martinez, Jennifer Dunne, and Rich
Williams of the Pacific Ecoinformatics and Computational Ecology Lab. We are in the
process of a thorough analysis of the results produced from these inference methods.
Forthcoming publications include Webs on the Web: An Ontology for Representing Food
Webs and Ecology on the Semantic Web which has been submitted to the Journal of Web
Semantics.
10.5   Conclusions and Vision
In this chapter I have presented several concrete projects that extend my
dissertation work , ranging from results that should quickly follow from the existing
research, to projects like MOAM that are longer term investigations.
This dissertation project has served as a specific application of the techniques of
studying the relationships in a system to understand their functional properties,
developing algorithms based on those properties to infer information about indirect
relationships, and integrating those inferences into applications. As a long-term project, I
believe this type of analysis is interesting and important. Systems that can be subjected to
this type of analysis underlie both common user experiences, like social networks, and
scientific research problems, such as food webs. By understanding more information
about the relationships in the system, and integrating that into applications in a way that
supports users, I believe there is great promise to increase the productivity of users and
the ability of applications to act intelligently with respect to the underlying systems.
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